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TAX ASSESSMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY: A PROPOSAL
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
THE real property tax is the primary instrument' and perennial whipping
boy of municipal finance.2 Characteristically, it is a nongraduated levy on the
1. In 1955, the most recent year for which statistics are available, general property
taxes constituted over 85% of the income from all sources of units below the state level,
and over 99% of their revenues from taxes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUmmARY OF GOVERN-
TENTAL FINANCES IN 1955, at 20 (1956). Federal property taxes are effectively barred
by U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, and state property taxes have dwindled in importance.
By 1957, 15 state governments had abandoned property taxation altogether and, in each
of 17 of the remaining 33 states, such taxation yielded less than $5,000,000. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, COMPENDIUM OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1957, at 11 (1958). See
generally Newcomer, The Decline of the General Property Tax, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 38,
45-46 (1953).
Property taxes account for about 94% of county and township tax revenues, almost
751' of city tax resources, 98% of school-district levies, and 100% of the tax collections
by special districts. When nontax revenues-mainly from public utilities, alcoholic
beverage sales, pension contributions and intergovernmental grants-are considered, prop-
erty taxes yield over half the income of townships and school districts and over one third
of aggregate county and city income. Self-supporting, publicly owned utilities account
for the fact that property taxes contribute only about one sixth of special district receipts.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1955, at 20 (1956). These
relationships seem to prevail regardless of the size of the locality. A 1949 study of tax
revenues in 18 large cities revealed that property taxes raised more than half the state and
local revenue in 5 cities and between one half and one third in 11 others. Manning,
Burdc of State and Local Taxes in 18 Large Cities, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 173, 175 (1949).
In most states municipalities impose both real and personal property taxes, with the
great bulk of property tax revenue clearly arising from the former. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD, EcoNo~i~c ALMANAC 1951-52, at 511 (1951); Musgrave, Carroll,
Cook & Frane, Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948,
4 NAT"L TAX J. 1, 21-22 (1951). In some states, personalty is excluded from the property
tax. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 3 (effective Oct. 1, 1959, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 300) (complete exclusion) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1050d (Supp. 1955) (exclusion of all
nonbusiness personalty); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:15 (1955) (exclusion of all intangibles).
In other states, personalty is subject to assessment or taxation at lower rates than realty.
See, e.g. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 84-301, -308 (Supp. 1957), 84-302 (1947) (fractional
assessment) ; Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5707.03, 5711.22 (Page 1954) (preferential rates).
And even in those states that purport to tax personalty fully, its underassessment is virtu-
ally universal. Newcomer, supra at 45-46. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 499
(Smith-Hurd 1954) with Troupis, Full Fair Value Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILL. L. REV.
160, 178 (1949).
2. See S. REP. No. 1310, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1956) (supplemental views of
Senator Paul H. Douglas that property tax is regressive) ; MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION
(1955) (similar) ; WASH. RFV. CODE ANN. § 84.41.010 (Supp. 1957) (inequitable admin-
istration) ; N.J. COMM'N ON STATE TAX POLICY, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX IN NEW
JERSEy 25-29 (6th rep. 1953) (same) ; Shannon, Recent Statewide Programs to Improve
Local Assessments, in 44 NATIONAL TAX ASs'N, PROCEEDINGS 161, 166-67 (1951) (asses-
sors' discretion results in usurpation of legislative functions).
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value of all taxable realty.3 Conceptually and functionally, it is the least satis-
factory of American taxes. 4 In contrast with the federal income tax-which
exacts revenues according to ability to pay, supplements national economic
policies, imposes a predictable liability on taxpayers, and operates with machine-
like precision through wage withholding procedures -the real estate tax com-
monly falls most heavily on those least able to pay, embodies no clear policy
ancillary to revenue raising, frustrates taxpayers who attempt to compute their
own liability, and invites political manipulation by local administrators. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the real property tax has stimulated various and vigor-
ous criticisms directed at its inefficiencies and inequities.6
Most of the inequities are attributes of the assessment process, which consists
of assigning a money value to individual realty parcels. 7 Given the total assessed
3. See Lutz, General Property Tax, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 602
(1931).
4. For the absence of a rationale supporting the tax and for its administrative com-
plexities, see 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 453-59, 480-99 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as BONRIGHT]; TAYLOR, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 295-307 (rev. ed. 1953).
In contrast, a properly designed sales tax is easy to administer, promotes increased invest-
ment and production, and relates tax level to consumption expenditures, arguably a superior
index of ability to pay than income. Customs levies, while not progressive, have the
acknowledged purpose of discouraging the importation of the taxed commodity. Even
though most tariffs are ad valorem, specific statutory provisions eliminate most valuation
problems. See 70 Stat. 943 (1956), 19 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (Supp. V, 1958). Excises may
be progressive, as are taxes on genuine luxuries, or regressive, like tobacco taxes. Most
excises, such as liquor, tobacco and oleomargarine taxes, are sumptuary taxes, designed
to discourage the consumption of the taxed articles. TAYLOR, THE ECONOMICS OF PUDLIC
FINANCE 240 (rev. ed. 1953). A major exception is the motor-vehicle fuel tax, which can
be regarded as part of the price highway users pay for road construction and maintenancc.
BOWMAN & BACH, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 725 (2d ed. 1949). The
balance of the excises, such as the taxes on cabarets and automobiles, are wartime hold-
overs originally intended to absorb excess consumer demand or shift it away from scarce
commodities. HART & BROWN, FINANCING DEFENSE 48-59 (1951). The few remaining
federal taxes-on narcotics, occupational gambling and the like-are really federal regu-
latory devices.
5. See generally, Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax
Provisions Get Enacted, 70 H~av. L. REv. 1145-55 (1957).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Assessment is a three-step process consisting of discovery of property to be taxed,
valuation, and review. See generally NATIONAL ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, ASSESS-
MENT PRINCIPLES AND TERMINOLOGY (1937); 1 BONBRIGHT 480-92.
As used in this Comment, "assessment" will ordinarily refer to valuation.
The discovery of realty long consisted of supplementing the prior year's tax roll with
new improvements shown on a "list" required to be filed annually by taxpayers, and with
those turned up by the more or less casual observations of the local assessor. Under this
system, both land and improvements often escaped assessment. NATIONAL ASS'N OF
ASSESSING OFFICERS, CoNSTRUCrION AND USE OF TAX MAPS 5-8 (1937). More modern
practice dispenses with taxpayers' lists and relies on surveys, maps, and aerial photography
and building-permit records. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1037d (Supp. 1955); WASH.
Rav. CODE AN. §§ 36.21.050-.080 (Supp. 1957).
Valuation is the second step in assessment. New improvements have customarily been
valued by acceptance of the owner's "listed" value. The infrequent revisions of "listed"
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value of all parcels, municipalities, school districts, and other spending authori-
ties can determine what percentage of that value should be set as the applicable
tax rate in order to produce desired revenues.8 The local officials who are
responsible for making assessments often occupy positions of unique autonomy,
partlybecause they may enjoy political independence from local spending authori-
ties,9 and partly because they invariably function under imprecise state legis-
lation which leaves them free to devise their own valuation standards. 10 As
values have reflected guesswork on the part of the assessor or community. Once estab-
lished, these values, diminished in conformity with the assessor's idea of a proper ratio
of assessed to computed value, have been copied onto each succeeding year's tax roll.
1 BONBPEIGHT 486-87; TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 295-301. Dissatisfaction with this
practice accounts for the provision in many statutes requiring the assessor personally to:
view each parcel annually. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-102 (Supp. 1957). Com-
pare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1064d (Supp. 1955) (realty must be viewed during decennial
revaluations) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-601, -626 (1956) (biennially). The multitude of
parcels, even in smaller municipalities, makes an annual viewing impractical. See Switz
v. Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 598-99, 130 A.2d 15, 25 (1957) ; HAIG & SHOUP, THE FINTAN-
CAt. PROBLEM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 143 (1952). Development of mass appraisal
techniques based on building costs has improved original assessments, but roll copying
is still common. Many statutes require revaluation only at intervals of up to ten years,
and evidence exists that even these requirements are not complied with. See, e.g., CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 1046d (Supp. 1955) (extending ten-year period to fifteen) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 105-278 (1958) (extending time for completion of quadrennial revaluation).
In many jurisdictions, local review boards oversee local assessors and state review
boards hear appeals from local boards. In some cases, these review boards consist of
county supervisors or state officers overseeing assessments in ex officio capacity. In other
cases, full time is devoted to tax duties. NATIOIAL ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, ASSESS-
MLNT SUPERVSlION (7th Progress Rep. 1940). Universally, state courts are open to
taxpayers either after or in lieu of recourse to review boards. Absent a state remedy
for the unequal treatment of taxpayers, federal courts may have jurisdiction under the
fourteenth amendment. See note 22 infra.
S. The preparation of a budget by the local executive proceeds concurrently with the
assessor's preparation of the "grand list" of realty assessments. The degree of coordination
and the direction of flow of influence between spending and assessing authorities depends
on local political conditions. The complete budget document shows contemplated total
spending and estimated non-realty-tax revenue. The realty tax rate is determined by
dividing the difference between these figures by the "grand list" total. The adoption of
the tax rate by a local legislative body is, technically, the levy, though usage has extended
the term to cover the entire process. BUCK, 'UNICIPAL BUDGETS AND BUDGET MAKING
39-60 (1925).
In many communities, tax-rate limits are so low that maximum levies are inescapable.
Total revenue can be increased only by increasing other taxes or by raising assessments.
See notes 13, 14, 26, 28 infra.
9. Assessors may be elected, locally appointed, or selected on higher governmental
levels. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASsEsSIN-G OFFICERS, SELECTION, TENURE, AND COmPENSATION
oF ASSESSORS (1940). While an elected assessor will ordinarily be a member of the local
political "team," he need not necessarily be. An appointed assessor may be politically
independent as the result of strict merit selection, or of a political difference behveen
those who govern the locality and those who appoint the assessor.
10. "Fair value," "true value" and "market value" are typical legislative assessment
standards. Assessors are commonly directed to seek the price that property would command
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a result, assessors can frequently manipulate their valuations to favor individual
taxpayers," to reduce the local incidence of state and county realty taxes,'"
to govern the revenue-raising power of municipalities, 13 and to subvert state
grant-in-aid requirements expressed in terms of local assessed valuations.
1"
Past legislative tinkering with realty taxation has generally produced meas-
ures which fall short of adequate reform. For example, tax exemptions favoring
farmers, veterans, and homeowners have partially compensated for the tax's
regressivity, 15 that is, its tendency to take greater proportions of income from
in a voluntary arm's-length sale. The assessor's attention is often directed to various factors,
including original or replacement cost, book value and income or earning capacity, but
these factors are never assigned specific statutory weights. For a summary of the value
provisions of all states, see appendix at p. 386 infra.
11. See text at notes 110-12 infra.
12. Such manipulation is possible in the not uncommon situation in which a single
realty parcel lies within two or more taxing jurisdictions. To avoid duplication of effort,
the assessed valuations of one jurisdiction-usually the town or county-are ordinarily
adopted by all taxing jurisdictions. If a levying district covers more than one assessing
district and levies are at a uniform rate, a local assessor can ensure that his constituents
will pay less than their share of taxes to the overlapping district by assessing property in
his community at lower levels than do neighboring assessors. See 1 BONRIGHT 503-04;
Weil, Property Tax Equalization in Illinois, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 157, 165-66 (1953) (citing
examples). In addition to the counties, cities, towns and villages, some 65,000 independent,
special-purpose taxing districts exist to supply schools, sewers, water, fire protection and
similar services. If the state itself utilizes a realty tax, an additional level is added to
the structure. HANSEN & PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE 82-90 (1944).
13. The taxing and borrowing powers on the local level are each frequently limited
to a given percentage of assessment valuation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 807 (1949),
363d (Supp. 1955) (debt limit) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1905, 194 6-62a (Supp. 1957)
(tax limits classified by purpose, size of levying unit and size of grand list) ; N.Y. LOCAL
FIN. LAW § 104 (debt limit) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.02 (Page 1953) (ten-mill
tax limit). See generally PRoPERTY TAX LIMITATION LAWS (Leet & Paige ed., Public
Administration Service Pub. No. 36, 1934) ; Morris, Evading Debt Limitations With
Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J.
234, 240-43 (1958). Where legal ceilings are lacking, limits not infrequently are
imposed by political realities. Whatever their source, when limits are reached the assessor
can, by varying assessments, produce corresponding changes in permissible municipal
spending and borrowing.
14. State grants-in-aid are commonly contingent on municipal expenditures for the
aided activity equal to a certain percentage of the municipality's total assessed property
valuation. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 286.4, 286A.1 (Supp. 1958) (local fifteen-mill
school tax prerequisite to state education aid) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 18-4 (Supp.
1958) (same). Where grants are conditioned on the expenditure of proportions of assessed
value rather than on total local expenditures, reduced assessments enable local communities
to receive state funds for lower corresponding amounts of local funds. See Troupis, Full
Fair Vahte Assessment in Illinois, 44 ILl.. L. R~v. 160, 165 (1949) ; cf. Davies, The
Louisiana Property Tax Relief Fund: A Source of Financial Assistance for Local Gov-
ernments, 1 NAT'L TAX J. 270, 271 (1948) (assessor manipulation to maximize state reim-
bursement for revenue lost through exemptions).
15. See notes 113-14, 128-30 and accompanying text infra.
Any flat rate deduction from taxable amount makes a tax more progressive. Thus, a
$1,000 exemption would make the effective rate of a 4% tax on a $5,000 assessment 3.2%,
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lower than higher income groups. 6 Since such exemptions provide irresponsible
legislators a means of distributing state gratuities by diminishing local reve-
nues 7 exemption provisions frequently assume pork-barrel dimensions and
thereby generate new inequities.' 8 More ambitiously, many states have at-
tempted to prevent the manipulation of assessment levels and to eliminate
needless discrimination within assessing districts. Hence that well-intended
commonplace-the statutory or constitutional requirement that every assess-
ment be made at a uniform proportion of the realty's "full value."'19 Despite
adjurations of this sort, local assessors habitually disregard the prescribed
proportion of "full value" and assign lower values to most property.20 Since
courts are rarely willing to order the costly and time-consuming general revalu-
ations necessary to correct what has become chronic underassessment, the judicial
maintenance of proper levels of assessed values is substantially foreclosed.
2 1
In fact, the judiciary has helped perpetuate underassessment by single-mindedly
on a $10,000 assessment 3.6%, and on a $20,000 assessment 3.8%. See generally, BLUM
& KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PRCGREssivE TAXATION 3-4 (1953).
16. See BOWMAN & BACH, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 711 (2d ed.
1949).
This Comment assumes that regressivity is an undesirable feature in a tax. For
commentators taking this view, see BLUM & KALvEN, op. cit. supra note 15; Surrey, The
Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV.
L. REv. 1145 (1957). For a contrary view, see Tucker, Distribution of Tax Burdens in
1948, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 278 (1951).
17. See Spears, Veterans' Property Tax Exemptions, 11 NAT'L TAX J. 129, 136
(1958). By reimbursing localities for revenue lost through exemptions, some states have
assumed responsibility for legislative exemptions. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 10, §§ 4(9),
4(9) (a), 4(9) (b).
18. Newcomer, The Growth of Property Tax Exemptions, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 116
(1953) ; Davies, The Louisiana Property Tax Relief Fund: A Source of Financial Assist-
ance for Local Governments, 1 NA'L TAX J. 270 (1948). Compare S. RP. No. 1310, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956) (criticisms of injustices involved in federal tax exemptions
and preferences) ; Surrey, supra note 16 (same).
19. For states requiring that assessments be at "full value" or similarly termed levels,
see appendix at p. 386 infra.
Uniform assessments may be specifically required. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-103
(1951) ; TEXAS CONST. art. 8, § 1. Alternatively, particular discriminations may be pro-
scribed. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 11, § 217 (requiring uniform treatment of "private cor-
porations, associations, and individuals") ; CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 2 (Cultivated and unculti-
vated land") ; Conn. Public Acts 1957, No. 673, §§ 6, 7, at 1090 (real and personal property).
Other states require uniformity only within reasonable classifications. See, e.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. 9, § 1 ("taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property"); FLA.
CONST. art. 9, § 1 ("uniform and equal" except intangibles at lower rate) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 84-301 (Supp. 1957) (seven property classes, three containing realty,
assessed at from 7 to 100%).
20. See text at notes 26-28 infra. For a discussion of the judicial dilemma posed
by undervaluation, see E. Ingraham Co. v. Bristol, 144 Conn. 374, 381-83, 132 A.2d 563,
566-67 (1957).
21. For a statement of the costs involved in a partial revaluation undertaken under
threat of mandamus, see Hammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 372 Pa. 85, 88, 92 A.2d
422, 425 (1952). The complexity of a comprehensive reassessment of an entire township
1958]
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enforcing the requirements that'property values be uniform.2 2 Litigating tax-
payers have accordingly been able to reduce their assessments to the prevailing,
administratively created proportion of "full value," while nonlitigating tax-
payers have been left to the assessor's mercy-and measure of value.
Another prevalent reform is designed to eliminate the uneven treatment of
taxpayers in different assessing districts. To this end, legislatures have created
county- and state-wide equalization boards, and have authorized them to adjust
general, interdistrict assessment levels.2 3 These provisions, like those decreeing
uniformity and granting exemptions, have had dubious success. The activities
of these boards have been at best sporadic,24 and equalization techniques have
led the New Jersey Supreme Court to approve a three-year stay of an order to that
effect in Switz v. Middletown, 23 N.J. 580, 597-99, 130 A.2d 15, 24-25 (1957). See also
Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1000 (1933).
Statutes in several states authorize central administrators to order reassessments on
petition by aggrieved taxpayers. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 70.75 (1955) ; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 71:12, 71:13 (1955) ; Nzm. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-307 to -310 (1943). In Wis-
consin these provisions are frequently invoked. Letter from Wisconsin Commissioner
of Taxation to the Yale Law Journal, Sept. 16, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. In
New Hampshire, they were used twice from 1946 through 1958. Letter from Secretary of
New Hampshire Tax Commission to the Yale Law Journal, Sept. 12, 1958, on file in Yale
Law Library. In Nebraska, they have never been employed. Letter from Assistant Tax
Commissioner of Nebraska to the Yale Law Journal, May 12, 1958, on file in Yale Law
Library. See also NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, ASSESSMENT SUPERVISION
20-25 (7th Progress Rep. 1940). Since tax commission orders affecting particular prop-
erties are generally reviewable, a refusal to grant a requested reassessment authorized
by statute could probably be judicially reviewed. Cf. Hill v. Marvin, 98 N.H. 519, 104
A.2d 200 (1954) (reviewing issuance of reassessment order).
22. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15, 291 P.2d 791 (1955) ; People ex rel.
Wangelin v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 357 Ill. 173, 180-81, 191 N.E. 296, 299 (1934) ; Appeal
of Matson, 152 Pa. Super. 424, 33 A.2d 464 (1943). See also 1 BONBRIGHT 500-03; Note,
Remnedies for Unequal Property Tax Assessment, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1000 (1933).
Failure to grant relief when lack of uniformity is sufficiently gross to support a pre-
sumption of deliberate discrimination, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and, absent a state remedy, is correctable in federal court. Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm,
258 U.S. 122 (1922) (dictum).
23. Lee, State Equalization of Local Assessments, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 176 (1953).
Typically, the equalization process calls for the computation of an assessment ratio based on
comparisons of either actual sales or independent appraisals of selected properties. See
Weil, Property Tax Equalization in Illinois, 6 NAT'L TAx J. 157 (1953) ; Welch Inter-
county Equalization in California, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 57, 148 (1957). This ratio may be
used to adjust assessment totals upon which allocations of state aid are based, or to compute
statutory debt and tax limits. See, e.g., N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3602 (state aid) ; N.Y. CoNsT.
art. 8, §§ 4, 10 (debt limits) ; N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 2(7-a) (tax limits). The ratio
may also be the basis for an across-the-board adjustment of individual assessments in a
given assessing or equalizing district. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:3-16, 54:3-19,
54:4-49 (Supp. 1957) (county equalization) ; Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 133.170, 133.180, 133.185
(1953) (state equalization).
24. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, EQUALIzATIoN AGENCIES 34-37 (6th
Progress Rep. 1940); SHANNON, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND ADmINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE IN VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR TAXATION IN KENTucxy passim (1957). But
see examples of active equalization programs cited note 23 supra.
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sometimes aggravated individual discrepancies in the process of redressing
overall imbalances.
2 5
Attempted reforms seeking to control spending by municipalities have also
had unfortunate effects on the property-assessment process. Specifically, the
legislative prescription of maximum local tax rates and debt limits enables asses-
sors to determine the level of municipal revenues and expenditures. 26 Limitations
on permissible tax rates manifestly do not restrict assessors in the exercise of
their discretion; and, in practice, assessors often defeat a legislature's intended
fiscal controls by varying the ratio of assessed to market values.2 7 Thus, tax-rate
limits merely shift the locus of authority over revenue levels from the elected
officials who set tax rates to the supposedly non-policy-making assessors and
the judges who occasionally review assessments.
28
The many objectionable features of realty taxation have encouraged the en-
actment of municipal sales 2 9 and income taxes,30 but these alternative sources
25. To the extent that equalization affects assessments, they ordinarily are raised
uniformly. Tax rates rarely are reduced commensurately, since communities generally
have large spending demands which keep tax rates at the maximum levels allowed by
statute or popular consent. When assessment rates are raised and tax rates are not
changed, the ratio between any two individuals' tax bills will remain constant, but the
increase imposed on the relatively overassessed taxpayer will be absolutely and proportion-
ally greater. The table below shows the possible results when individual assessments
in an underassessed community are uniformly doubled to bring the average assessment level
from 50% to 100% of computed value.
Before equalization After equalization
Taxpayer Taxpayer Taxpayer Taxpayer
A B A B
Computed value $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
Assessment $7,500 $2,500 $15,000 $5,000
Individual assessment ratio 75% 25% 150% 50%
Tax at 4% rate $300 $100 $600 $200
Cost of equalization $300 $100
But see SHANNON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 43-44 (assuming offsetting decreases in tax
rates).
26. See note 14 supra. For a discussion of the purposes and effects of tax-rate limita-
tions, see JENSEN, PRoPErY TAXATION IN THE UNITEI) STATES 468-69 (1931) ; Newcomer,
The Decline of the General Property Tax, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 38 (1953) ; Thompson, Effects of
Property Tax Limitations in West Virginia, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 129 (1951).
27. SHANNON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 3, 65, 102-08.
28. A not dissimilar shift of authority occurs whenever a legislature customarily
revises municipal tax-rate limits or provides alternative revenue sources on the petition of
municipalities. New York City, for instance, is dependent on the continued state authoriza-
tion of sales taxation and on new, state-authorized revenue sources to supplement the
statutorily limited realty tax. The annual struggle and compromise between state legis-
lators and city officials over city spending levels is notorious. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April
20, 1954, p. 1, col. 2; id., March 4, 1954, p. 1, col. 2; id. March 22, 1954, p. 18, col. 1.
29. Pioneered by New York City, local sales taxation has spread to four other cities
and three counties in New York State. In California and Illinois, 313 and 919 municipali-
ties, respectively, including Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago, employ sales tax-
ation. Forty-sLx communities in Mississippi have sales taxes, as does Washington, D.C.,
and scattered cities in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Vir-
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of revenue do not permit communities to remain fiscally independent in setting
their tax rates. Only so long as sales taxes are low will neighboring communities
be likely to adopt different rates; as rates and differentials increase, sales tax-
ation affects commerce adversely in high-rate localities. 31 As for municipal
income taxes, rate differentials are administratively burdensome unless the
employers of persons who live and work in different communities can allocate
all withheld taxes to one jurisdiction.32 Finally, both local income and sales taxes
ginia. Rates range from a high of 3% in New York City to a low of y2'% in the states of
Illinois and Mississippi and in Phoenix, Arizona. DUE, SALEs TAXATION 317 (1957).
See also Glander, New Types of Municipal Non-Property Tax Revenues, 3 NAT'L TAX
J. 97 (1950).
30. Seventeen cities and 396 boroughs, school districts and townships levy such taxes
in Pennsylvania. Sixteen Ohio cities employ the tax, as do St. Louis and four Kentucky
municipalities-Louisville, Paducah, Lexington and Newport. Washington, D.C., imposes
an income tax modeled after the federal one, but this municipality is generally classed
as a state rather than a city in fiscal discussions. New York City has unused authority to
impose an income tax. SIGAFOOS, THE MUNICIPAL INcOME TAX 1-11, 76 (1955).
Tax rates range from 14% in Philadelphia to Yst% in Williamsport, Pa. Rates are
ungraduated in all jurisdictions. Personal exemption provisions are rare, with only two
Ohio cities granting them. Ibid. Except in Ohio, where a unique "pre-emption" doctrine
gives localities the power to impose any tax not used by the state, Angell v. City of Toledo,
153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950), income tax authority is conferred by state statute,
Ky. REv. STAT. § 91.200(1) (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 92.110 (Supp. 1958); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53 §§ 6851, 15971 (1957).
31. See DUE, SALES TAXATION 316-20, 324 (1957). Compare HAIG & SHoUr, THE
SALEs TAX IN THE AMERICAN STATES 475-86 (1934).
To discourage local residents from shopping in neighboring towns which do not impose
sales taxes, cities exacting such taxes have commonly imposed use taxes on major out-of-
town purchases by residents. To allow local merchants to attract out-of-town shoppers,
purchases of nonresidents delivered out of town are exempted from the sales tax. E.g.,
NEiw YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ M41-15.0 to -17.0 (1956). Difficulties of en-
forcement limit the effectiveness of use taxes and nonresident exemption to sales of major
items. See DUE, SALES TAXATION 308-09 (1957) ; HAIG & SHouP, THE FINANCIAL PRon-
LEMI OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 204-06, 207-11 (1952). California, on the other hand,
has devised a system by which rates and rules are standardized among localities; however,
the system sacrifices local control and, in effect, coerces cities to adopt sales taxation
whether needed or not. DUE, SALEs TAXATION 320-23 (1957).
32. Most municipalities tax income earned elsewhere by their own residents, as well
as the local earnings of nonresidents. QUNITO, 'UNICIPAL INCOME TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 14, 44, 77-78 (Mayor's Comm. on Management Survey, Technical Mono-
graph No. 2, 1952). If an employer is asked to withhold varying amounts for a multi-
plicity of tax collectors, his bookkeeping requirements become oppressive. Since cities
generally lack the power to require a nonresident firm to withhold taxes, such an employer
may minimize his accounting complexities by refusing to withhold the tax. Tax evasion
by employees is thus abetted. SwAFoos, THE MUNICIPAL INcOmE TAX 42-45 (1955).
Two approaches to the employer's accounting problems have been developed. Pennsyl-
vania assigns half of the 1% maximum rate to each of two competing jurisdictions. This
tends to produce uniform '%% tax rates. Where a central city imposes an income tax
at the maximum rate allowed by statute, surrounding commuter towns can, by adopting
their own income tax, capture substantial revenues at no extra cost to most voters. But
this uniformity is achieved only by encouraging suburban areas to expand their spending
unrealistically, and by defeating the income tax's function of allowing central cities to
shift some costs of government to daytime residents. Dissatisfaction with these arrange-
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may be steeply regressive. The former are collected primarily from business
profits and withheld wages, but not from investment returns, nonbusiness capital
transactions, or self-employment earnings.3 3 For their part, sales taxes fall
most heavily on low-income families, who spend proportionately more for taxed
goods and less for untaxed services and savings than do higher-bracket groups. 34
The absence of an entirely satisfactory substitute for realty taxation compels
the acceptance of arguments for its retention. Realty's fixed situs and locally
recorded ownership make the tax easy to administer;35 the inability of local
taxing units to gain sufficient revenues from income and sales taxes demonstrates
the fiscal necessity of taxing real property.3 6 In any event, the limited voting
ments has led some central cities and neighboring towns to share revenues on other than
the statutory fifty-fifty basis. The necessity of negotiating sharing arrangements with
other jurisdictions limits local fiscal independence, but results in a more realistic allocation
of revenue between the central city and the suburbs. On the other hand, by eliminating
uniform rates, sharing reintroduces burdensome employer calculations. By establishing
a joint tax collector, however, cooperating localities can ease the employer's accounting
problems, for employers are then faced with only one tax rate and one collecting authority.
See id. at 27-30, 49-51. The second or Ohio approach-giving the place of employment
absolute priority-encounters difficulties similar to those obtaining in Pennsylvania. See
id. at 30.
33. SIGAFoos, THE MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX 19-22 (1955).
34. BOWMAN & BACH, EcoNomic ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 727 (2d ed. 1949);
TAYLOR, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 412 (rev. ed. 1953). Exempting food and
other necessities may partially offset this tendency. See McGrew, Effect of a Food Ex-
eniption on the Incidence of a Retail Sales Tax, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 362 (1949).
35. See Macy, Some Legal and Administrative Aspects of The Property Tax int
Oregon, 33 OaR. L. REv. 180-81 (1954). Compare NEW JERSEY COMm'N ON STATE TAx
POLICY, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAx IN NEw JERSEY at xxv (6th Rep., 1953) (arguing
that realty tax burden is lower than burdens of alternative taxes).
36. Even in municipalities which rely heavily on sales or income taxation, property
taxes continue to play a significant role.
Sales Tax Cities Total Tax Sales Tax Property Tax
Revenues Revenues* Revenues
(in thousands of dollars)
New York City $1,249,595 $345,705 $819,884
Los Angeles 104,377 29,033 59,595
Chicago 209,469 22,145 117,129
New Orleans 26,363 8,037 12,473
*Overstated; includes gross receipts tax.
Income Tax Cities Total Tax Income Tax' Property Tax
Revenues. Renevues .. " Revenwes. "
(in thousands of dollars)
Philadelphia $146,442 $53,127 $65,561
St. Louis 52,229 9,100 27,449
Cincinnati 33,722 12,482 18,138
Louisville 20,000 9,142 8,851
Source: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPENDIUM OF CITY GovERNImr FINANCES IN 1956, at
27, 37 (1957).
Compare ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, NEW SOURCES OF LOCAL RZvENUE
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power of urban property owners makes continued use of the tax almost certain.
Since the real property tax is, therefore, apparently destined to survive its
critics, means should be sought to eliminate its most grievous faults-its re-
gressivity and unpredictability, and the political manipulation of assessed
values.
TRADITIONAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES IN REALTY TAXATION
The seeds of realty tax reform are embedded in current assessment policies
and procedures, which have necessarily developed independently of such vague
definitions of taxable amount as "full value" and its variants--"cash value,"
"true value, .... actual value," and "fair value. '37 Assessors and courts, uncer-
tain as to the measurement systems and tax-distribution policies which these
terms obscure, have relied on their own ingenuity in implementing the statutory
standards. Whatever order and purpose the tax reflects must therefore be
attributed largely to adjudication and administration, not to legislation.
"Value" Under Different Computation Systenms
The techniques by which assessors and courts currently translate abstract
legislative statements of value into dollar amounts are the three standard
methods developed by professional appraisers and economists for other pur-
poses.38 The market-comparison approach utilizes the actual sales prices of
realty parcels comparable to the one being appraised.3 9 Alternatively,
depreciated reproduction cost measures present value by subtracting total
depreciation from the hypothetical current cost of reproducing the improve-
ments in question.4 0 Or, thirdly, realty can be valued by capitalizing anticipated
13-16 (1956) (property taxes must remain the primary though not sole source of local
revenue).
37. For the jurisdictions employing these terms, see appendix at p. 386 infra.
38. See WENDT, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 1-140 (1956) [hereinafter cited as WENDT];
1 BONBRIGHT 113-34.
39. See generally WENDT 253-92; WEIMER & HOYT, PRINCIPLES OF RE.AL ESTATE 260-
63 (3d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as WEIMER & HOYT]; 1 BONBRIGHT 127-39.
40. See WENDT 212-52; WEIMER & HOYT 262-69; 1 BONBIGIHT 140-215. Unlike the
other two approaches, depreciated reproduction cost measures the value of improvements
only. The theory of depreciated reproduction cost is that buyers would be willing to pay
as much as, and sellers unwilling to accept less than, the cost of replacement. In practice,
appraisers usually estimate the current cost of constructing the improvement anew and
then deduct the value lost by age. A variant method is to subtract depreciation from the
original cost and adjust for, price level changes. See Town of Kearny v. Division of
Tax Appeals, 137 NJ.L. 634, 61:.A.2d 208" (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 1 N.J. 409, 64 A.2d 67
(1948). -
Style changes which affect costs present vexing problems. Ignoring style changes
may result in predicting appraisals on costs of reconstructing improvements which, if
destroyed, would not be replaced. On the other hand, calculating replacement cost in terms of
structures conforming to present standards might produce a valuation far in excess of the
utility of the building being valued. To some degree, allowances for obsolescence avoid this
difficulty by adjusting for style changes to the extent that utility is reduced.
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future income.4 ' Under utopian, purely competitive market conditions, these
methods would always produce identical answers.42 Frictions and imperfec-
tions characterize the real market, however, so that the different valuation
methods can rarely be interchanged without affecting the result. Further, these
methods are not equally sensitive to fluctuations in consumer taste and general
business conditions.4 3 Finally, a particular method may become largely a
matter of speculation because sales data are unavailable, or construction or
rental figures are incomplete.
44
Even when a single method is applied to a given parcel at a given time,
several values may be found, for appraisals rest on commercial and economic
assumptions which can vary because they are not susceptible of empirical
proof. For example, the determination of depreciated reproduction cost involves
41. Income capitalization bases value on the present worth of future earnings. Income
currently attributable to the property is computed, projected into the future, and then
discounted in accordance with the interest rate for investments entailing similar risks.
Noncommercial property can be valued under this system by imputing to it rents earned
by comparable realty. See generally WENDT 141-211; WEimER & HOYT 255-60; 1 Box-
BRIGHT 216-32.
42. A change in either construction costs, sales prices or income-producing ability
theoretically produces corresponding changes in the other two. Buyers treat construction
as an alternative to purchase; therefore, if market prices rise above reproduction costs,
sales should drop and construction should increase. The price of existing structures would
then decline and construction costs rise until equilibrium was re-established. Similarly,
if extraordinarily large returns are produced by a class of property, investors will shift
investments from other classes of property to the more profitable class. The increased
buying of the profitable property will force up its price, while investors liquidating less
profitable holdings will drive prices down on other property. This process will continue
until equality of effective yield is restored. If the ability to produce and dispose of property
freely is assumed, examples can be multiplied to demonstrate unvarying uniformity. See
People cx rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 129-30, 38 N.E.2d 465,
467 (1941) ; Harvey, Valuation of Mortgage Security, 1957 U. 1u. L.F. 412, 416. But see
Harvey, Observations on the Cost Approach, 21 APPRAiSAL J. 514 n.3 (1953) (harmony
of reproduction-cost approach with capitalized-income and market approaches fudged
through use of obsolescence allowances).
43. Thus the technological changes that made multistoried factories obsolete did not
reduce their cost of reproduction. Despite their obsolescence, such structures may earn
substantial returns for owner-occupants, but the price that they command on the market is
substantially less than that of modern buildings. Similarly, the coming of television did
not make motion-picture theater construction cheaper, but the decline in the industry was
mirrored by a decline in theater sales prices and earnings. Compare B. F. Keith Columbus
Co. v. Board of Revision, 148 Ohio St. 253, 74 N.E.2d 359 (1947).
44. Sales data are uncommon for property specially constructed for a particular busi-
ness purpose. In some areas, farms are so rarely sold outside the family that market prices
are totally unavailable. See Luce, Assessment of Real Property for Taxation, 35 MIcH.
L. REv. 1217, 1222, 1226 (1937). In highly developed areas, sales of vacant land may be
virtually nonexistent. See Pitney v. Kelly, 21 N.J. Misc. 405, 34 A.2d 547 (B.T.A. 1943).
In markets dominated by owner occupancy, actual rental figures for use in capitalizing income
are lacking. Thus assessments for British local taxes based on net annual rents present
much the same problems as American fee valuation. See generally RYDE , RATING 241-630
(10th ed. 1956).
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such conjectural factors as a building's remaining life, and its rate of decline
in worth from its cost of construction to its scrap value.45 Hence, an assumption
about speculative elements of this sort ultimately controls the precise dollar
value assigned to total depreciation. Similarly, the market-comparison test is
based on assumptions concerning the relevance of sales data ;40 and income
capitalization is, essentially, an assumption as to future earnings and interest
rates.
47
The appraisal technique chosen and the appraiser's underlying assumptions
generally reflect the purpose for which value is being computed.48 The entre-
preneur ordinarily establishes a building's worth by estimating expected profits
from renting or using the structure. 49 The insurer against destruction com-
monly views the cost of replacement as the proper measure.50 And the real
estate broker doubtless assigns values in accordance with immediate sales
possibilities. Lenders may consider all three approaches, but their desire for
security will of course govern their commercial and economic assumptions.
Thus, the income that a lender capitalizes will be the minimum income reason-
ably foreseeable during the life of the loan; his estimate of reproduction cost
will emphasize the value lost and likely to be lost through age and changes in
the arts; and his comparative sales analysis will be in the context of foreclosure
sales."'
45. Appraisers establish depreciation either on the basis of "testimony of competent
valuation engineers who examined the property and inade estimates in respect of its con-
dition" or on "mere calculations made on averages and assumed probability." MAY, THE
VALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 145-57 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
46. Assumptions must be made concerning which features of realty affect sales
prices. See, e.g., People ex rel. Johnson v. Robison, 406 Ill. 280, 284, 94 N.E.2d 151, 153-
54 (1950) (other lot prices rejected for terrain differences). When maiket conditions
differ or when sales prices are affected by special, nonmonetary considerations, appraisers
may differ as to which sales of physically comparable property are relevant to taxable
value. Laflin v. State Bd. of Equalization, 156 Neb. 427, 56 N.W2d 469 (1953) (twenty-
year average used to eliminate peaks and troughs of market and atypical transactions) ;
L. Bamberger & Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 136 N.J.L. 463, 466, 57 A.2d 242 (Sup.
Ct. 1948), aff'd on dther grounds, 1 N.J. 151, 62 A.2d 389 (1949) (sale and lease-back
transaction not evidence of market price); Pitney v. Kelly, 21 N.J. Misc. 405, 34 A.2d
547 (B.T.A. 1943) (neither sales of trackside land by railroad to heavy shipper nor tax
sale by city relevant).
47. The appraiser must estimate not only the future income of the property being
valued but also the rate of interest that would have to be paid to induce investment in
the property. One recent writer has commented that "the concepts and techniques em-
ployed differ so widely that it appears that a capitalization rate must be conjured out
of the appraiser's head." WENDT 162. For an example of the confusion caused by such
speculation, see City of Newark v. Newark & Essex Bldg. Corp., 25 N.J. Misc. 228, 52
A.2d 541 (Div. Tax App. 1947) (four experts, three capitalization rates).
48. See 1 BONBRIGHT 4-5; BABCOCK, VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE 159-64 (1st ed.
1932).
49. See Seagram's Bet on Elegance, Architectural Forum, July 1958, p. 76.
50. See RODDA, FIRE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE 107 (1956).
51. See Harvey, Valuation of Mortgage Security, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 412.
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Courts and assessors choosing among diverse approaches and assumptions
in order to distribute tax burdens equitably receive no greater statutory guidance
than that value should be computed as at a private, arm's-length-rather than
a foreclosure or auction-sale. 2 True, some statutes, by referring to market
value, cost price, earnings and depreciated reproduction cost, enunciate obscure
criteria for selecting appraisal techniques.5 3 Regardless of statutory language,
however, courts in forty-seven states have interpreted their realty tax laws to
authorize assessors to consider all relevant facts, standards and assumptions.
54
Consequently, the taxpayer's ability to predict his property's taxable value has
been sacrificed in the interests of judicial and administrative flexibility.
Assessment in the Courts
Despite the obscurity of legislative policy and prevailing uncertainty over
appraisal standards-both likely sources of extensive litigation-taxpayers
rarely contest the assessor's techniques and assumptions. When a taxpayer's
total assessment is low, a dispute is unlikely, for habitual administrative under-
valuation then operates to convert large proportional errors into inconspicuous
dollar amounts. Moreover, so long as market or business conditions remain
relatively static, the annual re-use of previously established values limits the
occasions for controversy. And if, notwithstanding these deterrents, complaints
are raised, lawsuits frequently are avoided through negotiated compromises. 55
52. E.g., Aiuz. CODE ANN. § 73-203 (1940); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (Smith-
Hurd 1954) ; see appendix at p. 386 infra.
53. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-103 (1951); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-201 (Supp.
1957) ; see appendix at p. 386 infra.
54. The general rule is that assessors and courts must consider "all factors" and
may use any appropriate technique in ascertaining value. Some state statutes specifically
require an "all factors" approach. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-103 (1951); IowA
CODE ANN. § 441.13 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9769 (1953). Absent an "all factors"
statute, courts read all statutory "value" terms as synonyms. Compare ME. CoNsT. art.
9, § 8 ("just value") with Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 134 Me. 28, 180 Atl.
803, 804 (1935) ("just value," "market value," and "true value" synonymous). Compare
CAL_ REv. & TAx. CoDE §§ 110, 401 (1956) ("full cash value" defined in terms of "pay-
ment of a just debt from a solvent debtor") with De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San
Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544, 554-55 (1955) (statutory formula means "market
value" but all three standard valuation methods are appropriate). Compare WAsHff.
RE,. CODE ANN. § 84.40.030 (1957) with Bellingham Community Hotel v. Whatcom
County, 12 Wash. 2d 237, 121 P.2d 335, 338-39 (1942).
Wisconsin is the lone dissenter from the majority rule. Courts there read the statutory
value language--"the full value which could ordinarily be obtained . . .at private sale"
-to mean that the value obtained by the market-comparison test should always be de-
terminative. Wis. STAT. § 70.32(1) (1955) ; 1 BONBRIGHT 472-74 (collecting Wisconsin
cases). Even in Wisconsin, capitalized income and depreciated reproduction cost may be
considered as evidence of market value when sales data are lacking. See Buildings De-
velopment Co. v. Milwaukee, 225 Wis. 357, 274 N.W. 29 (1937); State ex el. Flambeau
Paper Co. v. Windus, 208 Wis. 583, 243 N.W. 216 (1932).
55. See Reuther, Management's View of State and Local Equalizatiom in 49 NAoNAL
TAx Ass'N, PRocEEiNos 455, 471-72 (1955).
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judicial presumptions of administrative correctness further discourage tax-
payers from having recourse to litigation. For instance, some courts deny
review absent a showing of actual or constructive fraud.56 Others will examine
contested assessments, but treat administrative valuations as conclusive unless
the complainant overcomes them by the weight of substantial evidence.57 In
the jurisdictions which are most favorable to taxpayer litigation and litigating
taxpayers, the presumption of administrative accuracy vanishes if the taxpayer
produces some evidence of incorrect valuation or discrimination; a court then
feels free to interpose its own judgment. 58 Judicial presumptions to one side,
the expense of assessment litigation can be especially prohibitive. When general
undervaluation exists, the taxpayer may have to prove not only the proper tax
value of his realty but also, through an independent appraisal of similar property,
that his realty is assessed above the general level.5 9 The appraisal fees alone
will usually be discouraging, especially since, if successful, the taxpayer would
rarely save more than forty dollars for every thousand by which his assessment
is reduced. 60
56. The difficulty of proving constructive fraud seems to vary with the desire of
the court to reach a particular result. Conpare People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill.
424, 63 N.E2d 513 (1945) (assessor's reliance on formula supports finding of fraud),
with People ex rel. Toman v. Marine Trust Co., 375 Ill. 488, 31 N.E.2d 933, 935 (1940)
(use of formula negates fraud). See Northwest Chemurgy Sec. Co. v. Chelan County, 38
Wash. 2d 87, 228 P.2d 129 (1951) (assessment at approximately 120% of value sustained,
but 400% assessment fraudulent).
57. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. City of Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 89 A.2d 385 (1952);
Bennett v. Board of Review, 234 Iowa 800, 13 N.W.2d 351 (1944) (division of expert
testimony; presumption not overcome); Mid-Continent Bldg. Co. v. Board of Equali-
zation, 184 Okla. 525, 88 P.2d 626 (1939) (clear and convincing proof required).
58. See, e.g., Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 120 A2d 77 (1956) (court
should ascertain value de novo) ; People ex rel. Beardsley v. Barber, 266 App. Div. 371,
43 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 706, 56 N.E.2d 587 (1944) (presumption vanishes
when substantial counter-evidence is offered) ; Ahern v. Board of Equalization, 160 Neb.
709, 71 N.W.2d 307 (1955) (presumption destroyed by assessor's failure to make personal
inspection and by taxpayer's introduction of expert testimony).
59. The task of mustering sufficient appraisals may be formidable. See J. Rosenbaum
& Sons v. Coulson, 246 Iowa 848, 69 N.W.2d 403 (1955) (appraisal of 124 parcels insuf-
ficient to overcome assessor evidence based on 6 lots) ; Le Dioyt v. County of Keith, 161
Neb. 615, 637-38, 74 N.W.2d 455, 468 (1956) (24 appraisals inadequate). New York has
attempted to ease the taxpayers' burden. See N.Y. TAx LAw §§ 292a, 293 (effective Oct.
1, 1959, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw §§ 716, 720). But with little success. See HoLz,
REDUCriON OF REAL EsTATE TAXES 4-5 (P.L.I. General Practice Series, rev. printing
1954); People ex rel. Ten Broeck Apartments Corp. v. Kinnaw, 276 App. Div. 722, 723,
97 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512-13 (1950) (dissenting opinion) (critically discussing New York
standard for adequate proof).
60. Standard appraisal fees are $100 per day. Small residential properties require
at least a half day's work, and additional compensation must be paid for time spent testify-
ing if settlement out of court is not achieved. Interview with Norman R. Benedict, M.A.I.,
Hamden, Conn., June 5, 1958; Letter from J. M. Cleminshaw Co., Cleveland, Ohio, to the
Yale Law Journal, June 18, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. Attempts to reduce costs
by use of real estate dealers (and other less highly compensated experts) are likely to
result in reduced judicial credence. See Le Dioyt v. County of Keith, supra note 59; J.
Rosenbaum & Sons v. Coulson, supra note 59.
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The relative infrequency with which the judiciary modifies assessor
valuations has not produced administrative caprice. In fact, during the past
thirty years many assessors have routinized their valuation procedures through
various systems commonly referred to as "scientific assessment." Designed
primarily to simplify the complexities of administering urban realty valuation,
these systems universally employ depreciated reproduction cost to compute
building values, and market-price comparisons to establish land values. 61 Thus,
"scientific assessment" comprises techniques which permit the application of
construction cost tables, depreciation schedules and master land-value maps
to the widest possible variety of sites and improvements.6 2 Uniform, if not
equitable, distribution of the tax burden is facilitated, and the discretion of
individual assessors is minimized. On the other hand, regularized procedures
further insulate the assessors from litigation and, hence, from judicial super-
vision. Whenever litigation occurs, however, courts carefully preserve their
power to review administrative standards, and to arrive at proper values by
means other than "scientific assessment."
63
Judicial efforts to distribute the realty tax burden equitably are verbalized
in terms of deciding which of the established appraisal techniques best effectu-
ates the legislative mandate to assess according to a given standard, such as
61. For a general discussion of "scientific assessment" techniques, see TAYLOR, ECONO-
.ICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 300-01 (rev. ed. 1953); 1 BONBRIGHT 480-86.
62. "Scientific" land valuation is based on the appraisal of lots located at key positions
in the community. These key lots are used to establish a standard value per front foot
for lots of a certain depth. An agreed-upon formula is then used to adjust lots of other
than standard depth, shape and location. "Scientific appraisal" also often involves public
consultations designed to arrive at the standard value per unit. See 1 BONBIIGHT 480-84;
Butler v. City of Des Moines, 219 Iowa 956, 957, 258 N.W. 755, 756 (1935).
Manuals are available listing average construction costs and standardized depreciation
rates for various types of structures and supplying adjustment factors for regional varia-
tions in construction details. See, for example, CLEfINSHAw, APPRAISERS MANUAL
(1947) (26 classifications priced) ; B. H. BOECKH & ASSOCIATES, MANUAL OF APPRAISALS
(3d ed. 1937). See generally Daniels v. Board of Review, 243 Iowa 405, 416-17, 52 N.W2d
1, 7-8 (1952).
For the use of land-value maps, see Butler v. City of Des Moines, supra at 957-59, 258
N.W. at 756; NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFIcERS, URBAN LAND AVpRAIsAL 55
(Assessment Practice Series No. 2, 1940).
63. See, e.g., Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 120 A.2d 77 (1956)
(judicial freedom); Iowa Bldg. Corp. v. Zirbel, 237 Iowa 242, 245, 21 N.W.2d 576, 579
(1946) (assessor must not rely solely on judgment of appraisal firm); Ahern v. Board
of Equalization, 160 Neb. 709, 71 N.W.2d 307 (1955) (hired appraiser must not rely on
only one method) ; North Side Laundry Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 168 Pa. Super. 495; 497, 79 A.2d 215, 217 (1951) (court finds assessor's standard
value also "actual value").
Occasional cases have reversed or affirmed "scientific" valuations because of
the system used and without regard for the particular result. See People ex rel. Bray v.
Golder, 83 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (scientific assessment considered no evidence
of value); Citizens' Comm. for Fair Property Taxation v. Warner, 127 Colo. 121, 254
P.2d 1005 (1953) (across-the-board increase under "scientific" revaluation program ap-
proved).
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"market value." Since legislative standards are notoriously elastic and appraisal
techniques rest partially on subjective assumptions, courts are able to settle
assessment controversies on the basis of the particular economic needs of
the community and the taxpayer. 64 For instance, the user's ability to pay tends
to control the resolution of conflicts over the assessment of "specialties"--
buildings constructed especially for one function and not readily adaptable to
other uses.66 Courts nonetheless articulate decisions of this sort as attempts to
reconcile or choose among the differing valuations which are produced by the
capitalized-income, depreciated-reproduction-cost, and market-comparison ap-
proaches.6 6 Similarly, unprofitable land uses may secure subsidies in the form
of reduced taxes; but the issue of subsidization is always framed as a question
either of selecting among valuations representing reproduction costs, or of
choosing lower figures derived from capitalized income or comparative sales .
T
Likewise, disputes over the proper treatment of assessments during periods of
generally rising or falling prices evoke judicial language about a "normal"
period of realty values.6
Specialities. Courts have generally insisted that the owners of specialties
pay taxes measured by earning capacity rather than the marketability of their
property. Since a specialty is an improvement designed for a single, particular
use, its potential sales price is frequently lower than its depreciated reproduc-
tion cost or its capitalized income. When seeking to maximize revenues, asses-
sors are therefore likely to measure a specialty's value by the latter methods.
Owners, of course, will then urge the appropriateness of market-comparison
figures. If the specialty is a profitable one, the courts in most states will use
its value to its owner as the proper standard and affirm administrative valu-
ations based on the depreciated reproduction cost.6 9 A minority of states, on
64. Many decisions, however, represent little more than compromises between con-
flicting testimony. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hotel St. George Corp. v. Lilly, 268 App.
Div. 830, 49 N.Y.S.2d 374, rev'd, 293 N.Y. 898, 60 N.E.2d 30 (1944). In other cases,
the conflicting claims concerning appropriate figures are so far removed from reality that
the courts accept any reasonable administrative action. See, e.g., Hammermill Paper
Co. v. Erie, 372 Pa. 85, 92 A.2d 422 (1952) (discussing relative merits of using 1941 and
1933 values in 1948 assessment).
65. For a definition of "specialty," see People ex rel. Sheffield Farms Co. v. Lilly,
270 App. Div. 812, 59 N.Y.S.2d 679, remanded, 295 N.Y. 354, 67 N.E.2d 579, restated dit
renand, 270 App. Div. 1052, 63 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1946), aff'd nere., 296 N.Y. 798, 71 N.E.2d
771 (1947).
66. See cases cited notes 69-74 infra.
67. See cases cited notes 80-87 infra.
68. See cases cited notes 92-95, 98 infra.
69. See People ex rel. New York Stock Exchange Bldg. Co. v. Cantor, 221 App.
Div. 193, 223 N.Y. Supp. 64 (1927); 1 BoNBvainr 474-79 (collecting cases). Property
need not return much monetary income to be considered profitable; courts may character-
ize as profitable any property being used in accordance with the owner's intentions.
Griffith v. Newark, 125 N.J.L. 57, 13 A.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (store and office building
designed partly as monument to owner); Eitingon v. Town of Stamford, 11 Conn. Supp.
241 (C.P. 1942), aff'd, 130 Conn. 418, 34 A.2d 878 (1943) (elaborate home rented to
owner's relative at rate inadequate to support reproduction-cost assessment).
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the other hand, insist on market-comparison valuations, 70 but, by presuming
the correctness of the assessors' figures, may allow the market value of special-
ties to be set at high levels which approximate reproduction costs.71 Under
either the reproduction- or quasi-reproduction-cost approach, courts exact tax
contributions from specialty owners which are in partial conformity with their
ability to pay. Since the capitalized-income rationale-which would tax prop-
erty strictly according to ability to pay-has been rejected in this context, a
specialty owner's profits arising from his efficiency or entrepreneurial ingenuity
cannot provide a basis for tax computations.
Extraordinarily profitable specialities are not valued strictly according to
ability to pay, because capitalized-income and sales-price valuations can reflect
the inadvertent inclusion of nonrealty items. Thus, assessors, unlike purchasers,
of such structures as hotels and office buildings, may not incorporate furniture,
equipment, or goodwill-or the capitalized earnings from personalty of this sort
-in their valuations.72 In other cases capitalization is proscribed on the ground
that business income may be partially attributable to a legal monopoly or some
other unique commercial advantage. 73 Simplifying the difficult task of segre-
gating the realty and personalty elements in earnings capitalizations or sales
figures, courts have adopted depreciated reproduction cost as a ceiling on
specialty assessments. 74 The judiciary has thereby accomplished, albeit crude-
ly, necessary distinctions between realty and personalty, for personalty is, by
statute or administrative practice, either fully tax-exempt or subject to lighter
taxes than realty.
75
70. See State ex rel. New Lisbon State Bank v. City of New Lisbon, 260 Wis. 607,
51 N.W.2d 509 (1952) (depreciated-reproduction-cost valuation of bank disapproved);
State ex rel. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weiher, 177 Wis. 445, 188 N.W. 598
(1922) (depreciated-reproduction-cost valuation of insurance home office reduced).
71. State ex rel. North Shore Development Co. v. Axtell, 216 Wis. 153, 256 N.W.
622, 624 (1934).
72. People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 83 N.E.2d
K39 (1949) (hotel) (collecting cases) ; Gibbs v. State Bd. of Taxes & Assessment, 101
N.J.L. 371, 129 AtI. 189 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925) (forbidding valuation based on rent).
Compare Simms v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 303, 217 P.2d 936, 944 (1950).
73. People ex rel. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Clapp, 152 N.Y. 490, 46 N.E. 842 (1897).
The monopoly value may flow from unique commercial position. See People ex rel.
Empire State Bldg. Corp. v. Boyland, 1 Misc. 2d 518, 523-24, 135 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769
(Sup. Ct 1954), aff'd inen. sub nora. In the matter of Empire State Bldg. Corp. v. Boy-
land, 1 App. Div. 2d 770, 149 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1956) (no addition to land value because
it is site of unique building). But if the monopoly results from a physical feature of the
land, the added value is attributable to realty. Cf. Natatorium Co. v. Bd. Com'rs, 67
Idaho 143, 150-51, 174 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1946) (concurring opinion) (income due to
natural spring properly attributable to realty).
74. People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v. Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 38 N.E.2d 465
(1941) (loft and office building); People ex rel. Manhattan Square Beresford, Inc. v.
Sexton, 284 N.Y. 145, 29 N.E.2d 654 (1940) (apartment house) (collecting cases). No
cases involving specialties have been found allowing assessment at more than reproduction
cost.
75. See note 1 supra.
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Subsidies. If an owner's profit expectations are not realized, courts will often
grant him a measure of tax relief. Although admittedly a stumbling-block to
the optimum allocation of productive resources, this assistance for marginal
or ailing businesses is a manifestation of the same policy which underlies legis-
lation like the protective tariff,7 6 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Act,77 the reorganization chapter of the Bankruptcy Act,78 and the loss carry-
over provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.7 9 Under the realty tax, this
policy is phrased in terms of "value." If a court finds that a parcel's value has
been impaired through obsolescence, it will usually grant relief by authorizing
appropriate deductions from depreciated reproduction cost, or by decreeing that
the capitalization of income is the proper assessment procedure. If, however,
the court attributes the parcel's subnormal income to the occupant's mismanage-
ment, concessions of this sort are refused on the ground that only the property's
income, not its inherent value, is affected.
If an obsolete structure has actually been sold, or is of a type which is actively
traded, a court seeking to reduce the property's assessment can do so by relying
on the relevant market price.80 Thus, a court assessed at $100,000 a mansion
which had been built at a cost of $1,000,000 and which, judging from its recent
history of sales induced by unprofitable uses, could neither be sold nor attract
developmental capital if assessed at its reproduction cost.8 ' On the other hand.
when property with impaired earnings has no ascertainable market price, its
obsolescence can be recognized through standard income-capitalization tech-
niques.8 2 And if suitable sales and income data are unavailable, tax liability
may be reduced by postulating the price at which the structure could be market-
ed.83 Whatever the method by which valuations below depreciated reproduction
76. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 687, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1952).
77. 61 Stat. 202 (1947).
78. Bankruptcy Act ch. X, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1952).
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b).
80. See, e.g., People ex rel. McGaughey v. Wilson, 367 Ill. 494, 12 N.E.2d 5 (1937)
(seventy-five-year-old three-story business building); People ex rel. The Lincoln, Inc.
v. Boyland, 279 App. Div. 882, 110 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1952) (facts set forth in dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 306 N.Y. 817, 118 N.E.2d 824 (1954) (hotel); People ex rel. Beardsley
v. Barber, 266 App. Div. 371, 43 N.Y.S2d 588 (1944) (lake-front resort property);
Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 437 (1947) (estate
bought for use as motel). But actual sales price is not controlling where time and a new
owner restore the property to serviceability. 22 Charlotte, Inc. v. Detroit, 294 Mich. 275,
293 N.W. 647 (1940) (hotel).
81. Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County, supra note 80.
82. Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 34 N.E2d 6?3
(1941) (gas mains) ; Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Jersey City, 18 N.J. Misc. 60, 11 A.2d 14
(B.T.A. 1940) (garage); People ex rel. The Lincoln, Inc. v. Boyland, 279 App. Div.
882, 883, 110 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (1952) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 306 N.Y. 817, 118
N.E.2d 824 (1954) (hotel).
83. Thus, where a factory building was so obsolete that a valuation expert "could
not conceive of any intelligent industry" buying "such an outmoded set of buildings," a
depreciated-reproduction-cost assessment was lowered, although the instant occupant had
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cost are computed, they subsidize modernization and encourage the continued
operation of industries basic to the economy of their communities.
No owner, however, can escape taxation altogether simply because his real
estate is obsolete. Failure to liquidate an unproductive building indicates that its
owner prizes its liquidation price less highly than the chance of improved earn-
ings. Hence, assessments are not reduced below salvage value, even when
obsolescence is recognized.8 4 Besides assuring that all owners will assume some
tax burden, the salvage-value floor is consistent with the dictate of sound land
policy that permanently unprofitable uses be terminated.
Unlike value lost through obsolescence, low returns caused by mismanage-
ment are seldom grounds for tax relief. Reasoning that a parcel's value is a
function of its earning capacity, not its actual yield, courts ignore the conse-
quences of managerial ineptitude.8 5 Accordingly, the market prices of compar-
able buildings in other than distress sales are used to assess conventional struc-
tures, since these prices are based on the expectations of purchasers rather than
the experience of sellers.86 In assessing specialties, however, sales data on com-
parable structures are usually unavailable, and income capitalization must there-
fore be utilized. The effects of mismanagement are here excluded by deriving
assessments from the earnings of a typical, well-managed specialty of the same
proved no loss of income. City of Trenton v. John A. Roebling Sons, 24 N.J. Super. 213,
219, 93 A.2d 785, 788 (App. Div. 1953). See National Folding Box Co. v. Board of Tax
Review, No. 51499, Ct. C.P., New Haven County, Conn., Apr. 2, 1957. But see Crucible
Steel Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 356 Pa. 373, 52 A.2d 190
(1947) (rejecting obsolescence argument when advanced in support of salvage-value
assessment of going steel plant).
84. [I] f the enterprise reaches the irreducible minimum as an enterprise and is abandoned,
its property is sold for its fair value on the open market. The assessors are required
by law to ascertain that value and make their assessments accordingly. Even if
a railroad is defunct as an entity, the value of its real estate apart from utilization
for railroad purposes is not only assessable, but it must be assessed "at the full
value thereof."
People cx rel. Lyford v. Allen, 286 App. Div. 621, 626, 146 N.Y.S.2d 186, 190-91 (1955);
ef. People ex rel. Toman v. Marine Trust Co., 375 Ill. 488, 31 N.E.2d 933 (1941).
85. "[E]arning capacity and actual earnings are by no means identical. What the
property efficiently managed should have earned, and not what it has earned under
incompetent operation, is the earning capacity that throws light on value." Harris Trust
& Say. Bank v. Earl, 26 F.2d 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1928) ; see Pitney v. Kelly, 21 N.J. Misc.
405, 34 A.2d 547 (B.T.A. 1943) (railroad poorly, if not improperly, run) ; cf. McArdle's
Estate v. City of Jackson, 215 Miss. 571, 61 So. 2d 400 (1952) (partially vacant land
valued as if adequately improved).
86. Cf. 22 Charlotte, Inc. v. Detroit, 294 Mich. 275, 293 N.W. 647 (1940) (purchaser
of defunct hotel restored productivity by repairs; purchase price not controlling). Statu-
tory language, see appendix at p. 386 infra, is so clear that taxpayers have rarely urged
that purchase prices in distress sales are evidence of value. An analogous question arises
when an owner allows property to be foreclosed for taxes, and purchasers at a tax sale
seek to reduce assessment to the tax-sale price. Such reductions have been consistently
denied. See, e.g., Davis v. Division of Tax Appeals, 135 N.J.L. 250, 51 A.2d 437 (Sup. Ct.
1947) ; Tidball v. Miller, 72 S.D. 243, 32 N.W.2d 683 (1948).
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sort rather than from the assessed specialty's actual receipts and expenditures.8 7
Although this procedure does not comport with the judicial policy of favoring
low-profit enterprises, it obviates the collection and analysis of the income
records of every individual speciality.
88
Business Cydes. In order to maintain the solvency of municipalities, assess-
ment reductions have frequently been denied in the face of general, coincident
declines in the profits, construction costs and sales values of real property. 0
During the Great Depression, realty owners who suffered economic hardship
were logical candidates for tax relief. But restrictive statutes, which limited
local taxing and borrowing power to specified proportions of total assessed
valuations, forced municipalities either to maintain the level of realty assess-
ments or to neglect mounting welfare obligations. ° Furthermore, payroll cuts
and other depression-created cost economies were offset by widespread tax de-
linquencies. 91 Assigning municipal solvency paramount importance,0 2 courts
averted fiscal shipwreck by developing the concept of the "normal" market.
Under this doctrine, low computations of value resulting from depressed busi-
ness conditions were in effect rejected, and the courts' estimates of value under
normal conditions were employed instead.93 In some states, the courts relied
on statutory language barring assessments based on prices obtained at fore-
87. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. City of Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 89 A.2d 385, 389 (1952)
(department store earnings vot relevant to valuation of department store building)
(collecting cases); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Division of Tax Appeals, 133
N.J.L. 153, 43 A.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (apartment house) ; In re Melcroft Corp., 256
App. Div. 291, 10 N.Y.S2d 27 (1939) (only reasonable costs allowed in determining
net income).
88. See Luce, Assessment of Real Property for Taxation, 35 MIcE. L. REv. 1217,
1230-31 (1937).
89. See generally 1 BONBRIGHT 163-72; Luce, supra note 88.
90. From 1927 to 1932, the property tax revenues of local governments dropped
from $4,360,000,000 to $4,159,000,000. Public welfare expenditures, on the other hand,
rose from $111,000,000 in 1927 to $370,000,000 in 1932 and $526,000,000 in 1934. The state
and federal governments recognized the financial squeeze on localities and increased
their aid programs. U.S. CENSUS, HIsToRIcAL STAxrsscs ON STATE AND LocAL GoVERN-
MENT FINANCES 1902-1953, at 21 (State and Local Government Special Study No. 38,
1955).
91. See Note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1317, 1320-21 (1933); Note, Propriety of Raising
Municipal Tax Rate to Allow for Delinquencies, 43 YALE L.J. 143 (1933).
92. "Violent fluctuations in municipal income are not desirable, and assessors in listing
values may, to a certain extent, disregard the excesses of a boom as well as the despair
of a depression." Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 134 Me. 28, 180 Atl. 803, 804
(1935). See also Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 306 Mass. 354, 28 N.E.2d 436 (1940);
Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 310 Mass. 199, 37 N.E.2d 459 (1941).
93. See, e.g., Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 Atl. 184 (1934); City
Holding Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 127 N.J.L. 168, 21 A.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ;
Appeal of Kliks, 158 Ore. 669, 76 P.2d 974 (1938). Another route to the same result was
the argument that to reduce the assessment of the litigating taxpayer to reflect depression
values would create inequality vis- -vis nonlitigating taxpayers. See Sloman-Polk Co.
v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 689, 247 N.W. 95 (1933), 33 COLUm. L. REv. 758. But see Detroit v.
Detroit & Canada Tunnel Co., 92 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1937) (effect of depression on earn-
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closure sales.9 4 In others where express legislative guidance was lacking,
judicial decisions were bottomed on the "inherent" meaning of "value." 95
Even after the economic tide had turned and inflationary pressures increased
the revenue demands of municipalities, "normal market" concepts remained
in vogue. Nor have they been abandoned despite continued pressures for the
release of additional taxing, borrowing, and spending power.96 The judiciary
has evidently recognized the inequity of abandoning the normal-market standard
before taxpayers could recoup their overpayments in depression years. In any
event, courts have not overruled the assessors' adherence to that standard. Thus,
taxpayers have benefited from the implicit extension of judicial language
about inherent value to cover an area-valuations in inflationary periods-
almost completely free of legislative guideposts.9 Today, assessments are
made and reviewed in terms of a normal period, usually one somewhere around
1940.98 As a result, communities have doubtless been forced to curtail their
taxation, spending, and level of services.
ings must be considered) ; Portland Silk Co. v. City of Middletown, 125 Conn. 172, 4 A.2d
422 (1939) (adopting depression market figure). In both the tunnel and silk company
cases, reduced assessments reflected obsolescence as well as general market declines.
94. See, e.g., Appeal of Kliks, supra note 93, at 672-73, 76 P.2d at 976 (statute called
for "amount such property would sell for at a voluntary sale made in the ordinary course
of business"). Compare City Holding Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, supra note 93,
with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23 (Supp. 1957).
95. See, e.g., Somers v. City of Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 174 Atl. 184 (1934); Alfred
J. Sweet, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 134 Me. 28, 180 Atl. 803 (1935).
96. Local expenditures for education increased steadily from $2,304,000,000 in 1944
to $6,824,000,000 in 1952. Highway expenditures showed a similar increase from $660,000,-
000 to $2,094,000,000 and, under pressure of increased living costs, welfare outlays had
increased to $1,378,000,000 in 1952 from a 1944 level of $556,000,000. Most spectacular
in relative increase were local investments in housing and community redevelopment, which
multiplied nearly twenty-fold from $46,000,000 in 1944 to $766,000,000 in 1952. U.S.
CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 90, at 21.
97. Maryland alone has legislation expressly covering assessments in periods of in-
flation. MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, § 14 (Supp. 1957).
98. Since assessors have generally adopted a policy of self-restraint and have predi-
cated values on a period of normalcy, few occasions have arisen for direct judicial
action. See Martin, Relationship Betweenr the Property Taxes and the Economy, in 45
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, PROCEDINGS 47, 52-55 (1952); Newcomer, The Decline
of the General Property Tax, 6 NAf'L TAX J. 38, 47 (1953). Courts have, however,
approved administrative practices by inference. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Brandt
Cabinet Works, 202 Md. 533, 539, 97 A.2d 290, 291-92 (1953) (assessors used table of
1940-1941 costs for old buildings and adjusted new building costs to 1940-1941 basis
"on the theory that [this] .. . reached actual cash value undistorted by temporary
inflation"); Hammermill Paper Co. v. Erie, 372 Pa. 85, 92 A.2d 422 (1952) ; Daniels v.
Board of Review, 243 Iowa 405, 52 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1952) (1943 values used by assessor
because "realistic"). In cases in which administrators have rejected "normal value,"
judges have voiced reproving dicta. See City of Newark v. West Milford Tp., 9 N.J. 295,
88 A.2d 211, 216 (1952) (general rise in realty prices not support for increased assessment
of watershed land; remanded on other grounds). Unreported cases may have held that
"normal value" is the invariable standard. See HAIG & SHoup, THE FNANCIAL PROBLEM
OF THE CITY oF NEW Youn 139 & n.16 (1952).
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Legislative Policy
A useful if elusive concept for the judiciary, "value" provides a less-than-
satisfactory framework for legislative policy making. Accordingly, few states
have bothered to refine this concept.99 Rather, statutes in all states authorize
particular interest groups to take deductions from their property valuations, or
to pay other, lighter taxes in lieu of realty levies.'00 Veterans, for instance, have
long been rewarded by special, fixed-amount deductions from the assessed value
of their real property.10 Owner-occupants of homes and farms receive similar
treatment ;102 and farmers have exerted sufficient pressure to secure additional
99. For attempts at defining value to meet the demands of particular situations, see
N.M. CoNsT. art. 8, § 6 ("plowing of land shall not be considered as adding value thereto
for the purpose of taxation") ; Wis. STAT. § 70.325 (1955) ("time and expense necessary
to market the lots" to be considered by assessor in valuing subdivision).
100. See generally Newcomer, The Growth of Property Tax Exemptions, 6 NATiL
TAX J. 116 (1953).
101. See generally Spears, Veterans' Property Tax Exemptions, 11 NAT'L TAX J. 129
(1958). Twenty-eight states have veterans' exemptions. Exemptions are limited to
disabled veterans in 14 of the 28 states; 7 grant larger benefits to disabled than to other
veterans; and the remaining 7 accord identical treatment to all veterans. Widows and
orphans of veterans commonly get similar exemptions. Ibid.
The size of a typical exemption varies from $500 in New Jersey to $5,000 in New
York and Louisiana; but the real significance of any dollar amount cannot, of course,
be comprehended unless the ratio of assessed to computed value is also known. Id. at
132-33.
California's exemption is conditioned on ownership of property assessed at less than
$5,000; and the Idaho disability exemption applies only to those with less than $3,60D in
property or annual income. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 1%; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105 (4) (e)
(Supp. 1957).
102. This homestead exemption is patterned after that applicable when a debtor's
property is subject to judicial sale. The purpose of the exemption is "(1) to recognize
and give effect to the principle of tax free homes as a public policy..., (2) to encourage
homebuilding and ownership, and (3) to give additional security to family groups." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9714 (1952). "Homestead" generally includes owner-occupied residences and
owner-operated farms; but in many cases it also extends to any real property, regardless
of use, with varying limitations as to value and size. See generally Comment, State Home-
stead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1036-40 (1937) ; Note, Homestead Tax Relief,
23 IOWA L. RFv. 67 (1937) ; Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Home-
stead Exemption: V, 2 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 346, 372-75 (1949).
Eleven states exempt homesteads from realty taxation. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 15
(1941) ($2,000 or 160 acres); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 192.12, .14, .19 (1943) ($5,000);
GA. CoNsT. art. 7, § 2-5404 ($2,000 exemption from state taxes only) ; IowA CoDE ANN.
§ 425.1, .11 (Supp. 1957) (partial exemption of $2,500 or, in urban areas, one-half acre) ;
LA. CoNsT. art. 10, §§ 4(9), 4(9) (a) ($2,000 or 160 acres); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13
(1947) ($4,000 exempt from state tax; urban homesteads assessed at 25% instead of
normal 40% of computed value; rural homesteads at 20% instead of normal 33%);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9714 (1942) ($5,000) ; N.C. CoNsT. art. 5, § 5 ($1,000) ; OKLA. CONsT.
art. 12-A, § 1; Oxi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 33, 34 (1954) ($1,000 or 160 acres if rural,
or 1 acre if urban) ; S.D. CODE § 57.0311 (7) (1939) (homestead exempt from state taxes) ;
TEx. CoNsT. art. 8, § I-a; Tzx. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7048a, § 2 (1951) ($3,000
exempt from 30-mill county road tax) ; UTAH CONsT. art. 13, § 2 ($2,000 exemption author-
ized; never enacted) ; WYo. CouP. STAT. ANN. § 32-105 (1945) ($5,000). Several other
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exemptions for certain agricultural improvements. 0 3 Likewise, urban influence
has produced measures favoring the construction and rehabilitation of apartment
buildings. 10 4 Competition among the states for new industry has resulted in
permissive or mandatory exemptions for sought-after enterprises. 10 5 Analogous
concessions have been accorded endeavors like timber operations and the de-
velopment of residential subdivisions. 06 And transportation, mining and other
industries have been permitted to pay lower franchise and income taxes instead
of their realty taxes. 0 7 Exemptions and substitute taxes thus permit legisla-
tures to effect social and economic policy without formally abandoning "value"
as an assessment standard.
states have similar exemptions from personal property taxes. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art.
13, § 10%; CArL REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 210, 210.5 (1956).
103. See, e.g., CAL. CoxsT. art. 13, § 12Y/4; CAL. REv. & TAX CoDn § 211 (1956)
(growing crops, trees and vines exempt) ; CoLo. CoNsr. art. 10, § 3; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 137-12-3 (4) (Supp. 1957) (irrigation ditches exempt) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-294
(Supp. 1957) (terracing and other soil conservation improvements exempt). See also
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13 (Supp. 1957) (ratio of assessed to computed value: rural
homestead 20%, other rural 3 3 1 s%, urban homestead 25%, other urban 40%) ; Henry, The
Farmers' Tax Burden, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1951).
104. New York State has enacted four such measures. The first, passed in 1920, allowed
localities to exempt until 1932 all new buildings used for dwellings. N.Y. Laws 1920, ch. 949
at 2487 (as amended, N.Y. TAX LAw § 5). In 1936, New York City was authorized to ex-
empt for five years value added by alterations if the value of the remodeling was less
than the value of the building. N.Y. Laws 1936, ch. 474, at 1190 (as amended, N.Y. TAX
LAW § 5-a). In 1939, all cities except New York City were given power to arrange a
twenty-year assessment freeze in exchange for the owner's expenditure on rehabilitation of
an amount equal to twice the assessment. N.Y. Laws 1939, ch. 754, at 1796 (now N.Y.
TAX LAW § 5-b). In 1946, all localities were authorized to allow exemptions sufficient to
enable an owner to recover, over a period of eight or twelve years, the cost of installing
central heating and adequate plumbing. N.Y. Laws 1946, ch. 321, at 882 (now N.Y. TAX
LAW § 5-c). Compare LA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 19 (owner-occupied dwellings built after adop-
tion of amendment partially exempt for limited time).
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 51, § 3 (Supp. 1955) (new factories may be ex-
empted by contract for 10 years) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-206 (1937) (new industry may be
exempted from local taxes by referendum) ; LA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 4(6) (industries located
on New Orleans Canal exempted if investment exceeds $25,000 and at least 25 persons are
employed) ; cf. VT. STAT. § 655 (1947) (personal property of industry occupying previously
vacant building and involving $10,000 investment may be exempted by town vote).
State development authorities evidently place great reliance on such devices, for tax
benefits are universally featured in promotional publications. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 6,
1958, § 3, p. 9, col. 5 ("South Carolina passes law reducing taxes on industry") ; id., May
4, 1958, § 10, p. 22, col. 3 ("Tax comparisons favor New York; no 'hidden costs' in state's
levy").
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEn. STAT. § 1781 (1941) (timber land) ; IowA CoDE ANN. 8
441.14 (1949) (forest and fruit trees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19 (1957) (subdivided
farm land); Wis. STAT. § 70.325 (1955) (subdivisions).
107. See, e.g., CoLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 137-5-4(2) (1953) (mines specially assessed
according to gross income) ; Conn. Public Acts 1957, No. 515, § 4, at 738 (gross receipts
tax on motor bus companies); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 308.705-.730 (1957) (optional gross
receipts tax for rural telephone exchanges) ; Cf. IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-744 (1951) (vessels
taxed according to tonnage).
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Administrative Practices
To achieve their policy goals, assessors utilize both the value-manipulation
techniques of the judiciary and the exemption approach of the legislatures.
Occasionally, judicial review compels assesors to justify their results in terms
of value. Generally, however, the infrequency of review permits a relatively
free exercise of the administrative power to grant partial exemptions through
underassessment; and, except in the context of litigation, assessors appear as
proponents of various taxpayer groups rather than as champions of the ex-
chequer. Thus, during the boom of the 1940's and 1950's, the normal-market
doctrine, which had been employed in depression years to maintain assessments
and to prevent fiscal collapse, 08 was retained despite municipal entreaties that
it be abandoned.'0 9 Other assessor policies favor particular classes of tax-
payers. Industries regarded as essential to the local economy are often attracted
or retained by informal agreements to underassess." 0 Homeowners in many
areas benefit from a lower ratio of assessed to computed value than that applied
to commercial property."' In addition, assessors commonly assign lesser values
to land on which houses are built than to identical lots in the same neighbor-
hood which are used commercially."
2
Haphazard administrative policy frequently produces residential valuations
which bear an inverse relationship to the owners' ability to pay. As property
values increase, assessments tend to be at lower percentages of computed
values." 3 The proclivity of more prosperous realty owners to seek reductions
may afford a partial explanation; and assessors may unconsciously harmonize
their computations with the interests of those who are politically dominant
and well-to-do. Also highly significant is the relative unfamiliarity of poorly
paid, inexpert assessors with the "values" of expensive homes." 4 Uniformity
is more likely to be achieved by professional assessors employing scientific pro-
cedures, but neither administrative skill nor judicial regulation currently offer
effective guarantees against political influence.
108. See SHANNON, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN
VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR TAXATION IN KENTUCKY 20-22 (1957) (maintenance of
assessments in face of falling values produced full value assessments) ; Zangerle, Tax
Assessments During a Depression, 15 PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 300, 305 (1933).
109. See note 98 supra.
110. McLAUGHLIN & ROBOCE, WHY INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH 114 (Nat'l Planning
Ass'n, Comm. of the South, Rep. No. 3, 1949) ; Snell, Tax Exemptions to Encourage In-
dustry, 29 TAXES 383, 385-86 (1951).
111. NEW JERSEY COMM'N ON STATE TAX POLICY, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX IN
NEW JERSEY 102 (6th Rep. 1953) ; HAIG & SHOUP, THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 136-39 (1952).
112. See J. Rosenbaum & Sons v. Coulson, 246 Iowa 848, 69 N.W.2d 403 (1955).
113. NEW JERSEY COMM'N ON STATE TAX POLICY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 94-101;
SILVERHERz, THE ASSESSMENT OF REAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 53 (10th Rep.
N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 1936).




The elusiveness of "value" has been maintained and exploited by legislative,
judicial, and administrative processes. Although a less malleable standard
might dispel taxpayer confusion, courts applying such a standard would find
it difficult to achieve suitable assessment adjustments for specialties, unprofit-
able uses, and financially needy spending authorities." 5 Similarly, to specify
valuation techniques with precision would simplify the assessor's task but
diminish his power to adjust conflicting interests. Therefore, uncertain assess-
ment standards must persist so long as legislative policy is geared solely to
creating exemptions for insistent pressure groups.
RECENT ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Without amplifying the fundamental statutory approach to realty taxation,
many legislatures have recently taken steps in the direction of inhibiting the
administrative manipulation of assessments. New measures have been added
to supplement the recognized inadequacies of politically inspired tax exemp-
tions, unfettered judicial discretion, and conventional uniformity clauses and
equalization boards."" Some states have initiated general studies of valuation
methods and problems of tax administration." 7 Others have authorized local
programs designed to accomplish the independent reappraisal of all realty." 8
A few states, either in conjunction with a program of reappraisal or separately,
have empowered a central administrator to promulgate rules and regulations
defining more clearly the existing constitutional and statutory standards of
",value.""l9
115. "On the whole, the courts have done well to avoid the formulation of any rigid
standard for the guidance of assessing officials. The legislatures or the people, as the case
may be, would likewise do well to repeal the market value rule and leave the courts
and the assessing officials free to work out the process of tax valuation as changing economic
conditions require." Luce, Assessment of Real Property for Taxation, 35 MIcH. L. REv.
1217, 1241-42 (1937).
116. For a summary of recent legislation and administrative activity, see Gronouski,
State Supervision of Property Tax Administration, 10 NAT'L TAx J. 158 (1957).
117. See, e.g., NEv. RE%. STAT. § 360.180 (1957).
118. See, e.g., ARIz. CODE ANN. §§ 73-121 to -123 (Supp. 1952).
119. The following provisions of the Arkansas act typify this innovation.
Section 3 ... the [Public Service] Commission shall do the following:
Prepare and promulgate Real Estate Assessment Manuals for the use and guidance
of County Assessors and County Equalization Boards ...
Section 4. The appraisal and assessment shall be according to value as required
by . . . the Constitution. ...
Section 5. It shall be the duty of the County Assessors and their deputies to
use and follow the assessment manuals and standards promulgated by the Com-
mission . ...
Ark. Acts 1955, act 153, at 359.
For similar legislation, see Md. Laws 1954, ch. 72, at 248 (now MD. CODE ANN. art.
81, § 232(2) (Supp. 1957)); Ohio Laws 1957, ch. 109, at 65 (now OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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The acts providing for further studies have not yet borne fruit. Ultimately,
they will be only as effective as their legislative end-products. Laws fostering
the use of independent, professional appraisers, rather than political appointees,
have improved the skill and consistency with which available assessment tech-
niques are used, but leave undiminished the fundamental discretion reserved
to assessors and assessment reviewers. 120 The most ambitious of the reforms
undertaken-the statutes vesting clarification powers in a state tax adminis-
trator-have to date resulted in rules and regulations which fail to correct
many sources of regressivity, political distortion, and taxpayer uncertdinty.
The central administrators have in fact achieved little more than would also
be possible under the more modest legislation sanctioning independent reap-
praisals.
All promulgations under the rules-and-regulations statutes have followed
the methods of "scientific assessment." Accordingly, improvements are valued
on the basis of depreciated reproducton cost, and land by the market-compari-
son method.' 2 1 This separate valuation of land and improvements is sensible,
administratively and socially, for it permits opposing policy considerations to
receive expression in the assessment of a given.parcel. Moreover, the consistent
treatment of all parcels is facilitated if land-use policies are manifested in terms
§§ 5703.02(k), 5713.03 (Page Supp. 1958)) ; Wyo. Laws 1957, ch. 171, § 1, at 283 (now
Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-506 (Supp. 1957)).
Comparable laws in Florida, Nebraska and Washington have not been put into effect
by administrators. Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 22079, § 46, at 888 (now FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.31
(Supp. 1957)) ; Letter from General Counsel, Office of the Comptroller, State of Florida,
to the Yale Law Journal, April 25, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library; Neb. Laws 1957,
ch. 322, § 1 (now NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-303 (Supp. 1957)); NEBRASKA STATE
TAX COMm'N, ASSESSORS' HANDBOOK AND RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ASSESS-
MENT OF PROPERTY 1958, rule 3; [1958] COUNTY ASSESSORS' ASSociATIoN OF NEBRASKA,
PROCEEDINGS 35; Wash. Laws 1955, ch. 251, § 9, at 1030 (now WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
84.41.090 (Supp. 1957)) ; Letter from Supervisor, Assessment Standards Division, Wash-
ington State Tax Comm'n, to the Yale Law Journal, June 3, 1958, on file in Yale Law
Library. A rules-and-regulations statute has been enacted in Oregon to become effective
in 1961. Ore. Laws 1953, ch. 701, § 2, at 1363 (now ORE. REV. STAT. § 308.205(2) (Supp.
1957)).
120. For an act contemplating independent appraisals by private firms, see WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84.41.010-.120 (1957). For an act requiring that public assessors be
professionally qualified appraisers, see ORE REV. STAT. §§ 308.010, .231 (1957).
121. See ARKANSAS ASSESSMfENT COORDINATING DIVISION, ASSESSORS MANUAL pasSim
(1956) [hereinafter cited as AR. MANUAL]. The Arkansas state tax authorities compiled
and published this 199-page assessor's manual, which contains detailed instructions for
mapping, classifying and valuing land, and provides cost and depreciation tables for assess-
ing improvements. The Maryland and Wyoming authorities adopted a commercial ap-
praisers' handbook, the Boeckhi Manual of Appraisal, as standard. Maryland State Tax
Comm'n, Letter of Instructions to Assessing Officials § 3(d) (March 12, 1958) [hereinafter
cited as Md. Instructions]; Letter from Director, Ad Valorem Tax Department, Wyom-
ing Board of Equalization, to the Yale Law Journal, June 5, 1958, on file in Yale Law
Library. The Ohio regulations outline a "scientific assessment" method based on land-
value maps and building cost schedules prepared by county officials. OHIO BOARD OF TAX
APPEALS, RULES 104-06 (1957) [hereinafter cited as OIo RULES].
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of lot valuations, and policies geared to ability to pay or adequate standards of
upkeep are reflected in building assessments. For instance, both ability-to-pay
criteria and building-upkeep objectives suggest reducing the assessments of
large but unfashionable urban dwellings when they are converted to lower-
income housing uses. But in an area undergoing transformation from resi-
dential to economically more productive employment, the undesirability of
nonconforming uses and the potential increased return to the community from
new uses would indicate imposing high assessments to accelerate the change.
The separate assessment of land and improvements could automatically har-
monize these antithetical policies without the interposition of an assessor's
independent judgment. Moreover, since the reproduction-cost approach is in-
applicable to land, separate valuation would enable administrators to utilize
the most practical methods for simultaneously yet equitably assessing all build-
ings and lots.
The rules and regulations in all jurisdictions retain in substance previous
administrative and judicial tax-distribution policies. The subsidization of low-
profit buildings is continued by permitting the diminution of depreciated repro-
duction cost to reflect economic and functional obsolescence. 122 Likewise, ex-
tremely profitable specialities are not penalized because "reverse obsolescence"
need not receive recognition, and depreciated reproduction cost represents a
ceiling on assessments. 2 3 Varying effect is accorded the normal-market doc-
trine, but, in all cases, limits on local taxing and borrowing are imposed.
Wlyoming has established 1938-1939 as the normal period for construction costs
and requires assessment at sixty per cent of computed cost.124 Arkansas, con-
templating frequent revision, has promulgated cost tables based on current
prices, but limits assessments to twenty per cent of computed value pending the
adoption of budgetary controls. 125 The Maryland regulations require assessors
to ignore price inflation, and suggest an assessment ratio of fifty per cent of
current market price. 126 Ohio specifies the date--currently 1956-as of which
local assessors are to calculate costs. But state authorities retain control over
122. ARK. MANUAL 73 ("By capitalization of income, it is possible to arrive at an
indicated value of commercial properties") ; Md. Instructions 1 (c) ("the following factors
are to be considered: . . . (2) Reproduction cost less depreciation and/or obsolescence;
and (3)-In the case of rental or commercial properties a fair and reasonable capitalization
of icorm-") ; OHio RULFS 107 (providing for functional and economic obsolescence);
Letter from Director, Ad Valorem Tax Department, Wyoming Board of Equalization,
to the Yale Law Journal, June 12, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library (assessors may use
their judgment and modify valuations in individual cases).
123. See text at notes 72-75 supra.
124. Letter from Director, Ad Valorem Tax Department, Wyoming Board of Equali-
zation, to the Yale Law Journal, June 5, 1953, on file in Yale Law Library. Wyoming's
tax limits are doubly dependent on assessment ratios since, as valuations rise, the maximum
rate falls. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-201 to -208 (Supp. 1957).
125. Ark. Acts 1955, act 153, § 4, at 362. Arkansas currently has conventional tax-
rate limits. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-302 to -304 (1947).
126. Md. Instructions § 3. Maryland has no overall tax-rate limit, but individual
limits have been established for most .localities either by the state legislature or by the
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the ratio of assessed to computed value and therefore can offset any increase in
assessments. Furthermore, such increases are automatically compensated for
by the reduction of any tax rate which a local vote had authorized in excess
of the statutory limit.'27
The rules-and-regulations statutes have attacked only the grossest mani-
festations of regressivity and have left undisturbed its underlying causes. True,
increased central supervision, together with improved technical procedures,
should correct the tendency of local administrators to assess cheap properties
more stringently than expensive ones, and should help bring everyone's realty
taxes into the same proportional relationship with the worth of his property. A
tax's regressivity, however, is measured not by the relationship of the amount
exacted to the worth of the taxpayer's property, but by the relationship of the
amount exacted to the taxpayer's income.128 Even under ideal assessment condi-
tions, taxes on residences fall more heavily on lower than higher income groups
because the former spend a greater proportion of their budgets for housing. 12 9
Analogously, obsolescence allowances granted to a business adjust its property
taxes to conform with the income of the business and not necessarily with the
income of those who pay the taxes, for, ultimately, taxes on commercial entities
are usually paid by individuals whose income is not identical with that of the
taxed enterprise. The tax legally imposed on a farm, factory, store or rented
dwelling, for instance, will eventually be paid, economically, in higher prices
charged customers or tenants, in reduced earnings by materialmen, employees,
and lenders, or in lower profits for the owners.' 30 So long as rules-and-regula-
municipalities themselves under home rule powers. MD. CoNsT. art. XI-E, § 5; Letter
from Director, Maryland Department of Legislative Reference, to the Yale Law Journal,
Oct. 10, 1958, on file in the Yale Law Library.
127. O mo RULES 100, 106(A); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5705.02, .07, 5713.11 (Page
Supp. 1958).
128. See text at note 16 supra.
129. See MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 42-45, 60-73 (1955).
130. The process by which the person legally liable for a tax recovers tax payments
from other contestants in the economic arena is called shifting. Shifting can be accom-
plished only when economic conditions permit the legal payor of the tax to raise the
price he obtains for the goods and services he sells, or to lower the price he pays for the
goods and services, including labor and the use of money, which he buys. See generally
ALLEN & BROWNLEE, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANcE 215-16 (1947); SELIGMAN, THE
SHIFTING AND INCIDENcE OF TAXATION 1-15 (5th ed. 1926).
In all cases, for shifting to be possible enough consumers (or suppliers) must be
sufficiently eager to buy (or sell) to allow the producer to raise his price (or cut his costs)
without affecting the volume he can sell (or buy) so drastically as to lose more profit than
he gains. ALLEN & BROWNLEE, op. cit. .tpra at 216, 225-27; TAYLOR, TiE EcoNoIcs OF
PuBLIc FINANCE 287 (rev. ed. 1953). But such eagerness alone does not allow shifting.
By the hypothesis of economists, the price before imposition of the tax will be set at that
point which maximizes profits. See SAMUELSON, EcoNoMIcs 502-06 (2d ed. 1951). There-
fore, even given such a consumption (or production) pattern, shifting will not occur unless
the imposition of the tax, by changing the producer's cost pattern, makes another price-
volume combination more profitable, TAYLOR, op. cit. supra at 267-75, 281-87; or unless
the imposition increases the quantity that can be sold at a given level of price, see VoN
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tions statutes establish criteria derived solely from the qualities of property
owned and without regard to the identity or income of those who actually pay
the tax, the perpetuation of current regressive effects is inevitable.
The legislative failure to remedy regressivity is understandable in view
of the statistical and theoretical difficulty of identifying actual, ultimate tax-
payers. 13 1 Only the owner-occupants of residential properties may be certain
bearers of the tax; they ordinarily do not shift it because their relations with
MERiNG, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATIoN 92-94 (1942). The former change
can occur when the tax imposed is such that the producer can reduce his tax liability by
reducing his production. Shifting is possible under the latter explanation when the tax-
in addition to being imposed on the producer in question-is imposed in a shiftable form
on the producer of a competing good. Then, the tax, by raising the price of competing
products, increases the price consumers may be willing to pay for the product in question.
Thus, entrepreneurs contemplating the construction of buildings for leasing probably
take realty taxes into consideration in determining at what level rents should be set. If
the market is such that the indicated rents cannot be obtained, the project will be abandoned.
Since some prospective tenants will be willing to pay more for new quarters than other
prospective tenants, the abandonment of some projects will allow higher rentals on the
remaining ones. On the other hand, the builder may cut costs and produce a less expensive,
less highly taxed building to rent at an undiminished rent; the consumer will thus receive
less for his money. A third possibility, however, is that the alternative of no profit may
induce some builders to accept lower rents and hence to absorb some of the tax. The
most likely net result will be that the tax, to the extent that it is not avoided by the
abandonment of building plans or the substitution of cheaper construction at lower rents,
will be borne by the tenant.
Such direct shifting is impossible in the case of existing structures. A tax increase
is unlikely to result in buildings being withdrawn from the market. Withdrawal can
reduce the tax imposed only if accompanied by the demolition of the improvement or
the abandonment of the property for taxes. Moreover, many of the other costs of building
ownership, notably interest on mortgage debt and insurance, continue unaffected by va-
cancy. E. M. FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE 'MARKETS, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCING
103 (1951). The fact that the landlords of existing structures pay higher taxes cannot,
in itself, therefore, lead to higher rents. See SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra at 287-89. But see
MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 112-15 (1955).
Existing structures compete for tenants not only among themselves but also with new
structures, however. To the extent that a tax increase is reflected in a reduced quantity
of, and a higher price for, new rental accommodations, landlords of existing structures will
be enabled to raise rentals (or, equivalently, to diminish services) without inducing tenants
to move to the new structures. Those owners thereby recover at least part of the added
tax. See generally VON MERING, op. cit. supra at 158-70.
Finally, it must be noted that taxes will have effects beyond the limited shifting here
discussed. Windfall or intended benefits may accrue to tax-free producers whose com-
petitors are taxed. Continued tax discrimination may lead to shifts of consumer preference
toward or away from certain products. Increasing or decreasing total taxes may affect
total disposable income and hence the level as well as the pattern of consumption, production,
and investment. And government spending of tax revenues will of course have its own
varied and far reaching effects. See generally Musgrave, Carroll, Cook & Frane, Distri-
bution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 1,
5-8 (1951).
131. The most recent large-scale attempt to assess the incidence of property taxation
is found in a study attempting to allocate the nation's total tax burden by income class,
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sellers and lenders are fixed at the time of purchase, and vendees can rarely
obtain price discounts representing capitalized future tax payments.132 Whether
taxes on rental property (business or residential) are borne by landlords or
tenants depends upon conditions in the real estate market, 33 the relative
and to determine the net progressivity of all taxes. The study was conducted by Professor
Richard A. Musgrave of the University of Michigan, and was challenged on many
grounds, including the allocation of realty tax load, by Dr. Rufus S. Tucker, a General
Motors economist.
Musgrave's Estimates Tucker's Estimates
Proportion Borne By Proportion Borne By
Tax on Tenants or Tenants or
Owners Customers Owners Customers
Owner-occupied Dwellings* all none all none
Leased Residences* 1/3 2/3 1/2 1/2
Business Property* 113 2/3 3/4 1/4
Farms* 2/3 1/3 5/6 1/6
*Including land.
Musgrave, Carroll, Cook & Frane, Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A
Case Study for 1948, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 22-23 (1951) ; Tucker, Distribution of Tax Bur-
dens in 1948, 4 NATL TAx J. 269, 278-80 (1951).
Musgrave's summation of the ensuing dispute was:
Dr. Tucker limits shifting of the tax on improvements [excluding land] to one-half
in the case of farms, three-eighths in the case of business, and three-quarters in the
case of rental property. Our assumption had been that the entire tax on improve-
ments is shifted. It is a matter of judgment as to which assumption is more nearly
correct.... In the absence of empirical studies, Dr. Tucker is entitled to his assump-
tion, however, as we are to ours.
Musgrave & Frane, Rejoinder to Dr. Tucker, 5 NAT'L TAX J. 15, 27 (1952).
132. Some shifting of future tax burdens may be possible at the time that an owner-
occupied house is purchased. To the extent that property taxes are taken into consideration
when buying a house, they will reduce amounts which purchasers are willing to spend and
thus cause a decline in the price of homes. The extent of this decline for a given home
will represent a recovery by the purchaser of expected future tax payments. See SELiGc-
MIAN, INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 221-26 (3d ed. 1910); TAYLOR, THE EcoNomics OF PUBUC
FINANCE 264-67 (rev. ed. 1953). Shifting at time of purchase-capitalization-probably
occurs rarely in the case of houses purchased for owner occupancy, since prospective home-
owners are unlikely to give tax considerations much weight. In fact, high taxes may
reflect extensive community services which enhance the marketability of residences, and
the downward pressure which taxes exert on prices may be offset by the demand for
such services.
133. The real estate market is particularly subject to cyclical variations. While a
downswing in. business may very well bring -building to a complete halt, it will not, unless
so long-lasting as to result in buildings being allowed to go to ruin, significantly reduce the
physical inventory of available structures. A depression does, however-because of busi-
ness failures, retrenchments, doubling up and postponement of family formation-drastic-
ally reduce the demand for accommodations, both business and residential. The resultant
oversupply produces a buyers' market in which landlords are unlikely to be able to raise
rents to recoup tax increases. The inability of owners to meet operating costs will not
reduce supply, since existing structures will then pass by foreclosure either to mortgagees
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bargaining positions of lessors and lessees, and the importance that they
attach to tax considerations. 34 These questions are further complicated by the
facts that each realty parcel constitutes a unique and separate "market," buyers,
sellers, landlords and tenants may be amateurs, and the integrating influence
of a public exchange or price-setting producer is lacking.13 5 Needless to say,
this extreme fractionization of the real estate market prevents legislatures from
predicting the incidence of the realty tax on any group. Even if the market's
vagaries were susceptible of comprehension, ultimate tax burdens would be
clarified only with respect to the occupants of purchased or leased residential
property, 3 6 and not with respect to business occupants. The latter taxpayers,
whether owners or tenants, might still shift their taxes to customers or sup-
or taxing authorities, either of whom will be likely to keep the property on the market
to minimize losses, even if gains are impossible. E. M. FISHER, op. cit. supra note 130,
at 102-09.
Conversely, a boom is likely to result in a prolonged state of undersupply. Despite de-
mands for accommodations on the part of expanding businesses and more numerous, larger
and more prosperous families, builders will be inhibited by fears that the demand may
be temporary and the risks long-term, by inevitable delays in preparing new land or
clearing old land for new construction, and by limitations on the capacity of lenders and
the building industry. Under such conditions of shortage, shifting would be impossible,
since the reservoir of unfilled demand means that new construction would probably con-
tinue unabated even if taxes were increased. E. M. FISHER, op. cit. supra note 130, at
98-100. If the shortage produced rent controls, the possibility of shifting would depend
on whether or not increased costs were automatically followed by the allowance of rent
increases. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8584(4); E. M. FIsHER, op. cit. supra note 130, at
109-117.
134. Even with respect to business participants in realty transactions, the multiplicity
of factors affecting purchase and rental decisions is likely to relegate conjectures about
future realty tax levels to a fairly minor role. See WEIMER & HOYT 463-67. Compare
WENDT 287-90; Garwood, Taxes and Industrial Location, 5 NAT'L TAX J. 365 (1952).
135. E. M. FISHER, op. cit. supra note 130 at 12. Fisher lists among other elements
contributing to the fractionization of the real estate market the permanent nature of
realty, the perishability and localization of the services derived from land and improve-
ments, the difficulty of comparing the services rendered by different parcels, the constant
fluctuations in consumer standards, and the inflexibility of supply and the variability of
demand. Id. at 4-12.
Information about realty prices is particularly elusive. True, local newspapers usually
list realty transactions, and commercial reporting services make similar information
available to the real estate trade. See Townsend, Inequalities of Residential Property
Taxation in Mefropolitan. Boston, 4 NAT'L TAX J. 361 n.2 (1951). But the conventions of
conveyancing frequently conceal the actual considerations paid for real estate. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 86 (1954) ; BALLANTINE, PREPARATION
OF CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES 76 (1921). See also WEMER & HoYT 262 (listing
available sources of information). While actual consideration can be estimated from the
face value of federal documentary stamps attached to a given deed, this technique can lead
to serious inaccuracies and does not reveal financing terms and other noncash factors in
a transaction. Mitchell, Using Sales Data to Measure the Quality of Property Tax Ad-
ministration, 1 NAT'L TAX J. 330, 335-36 (1948).
136. Since the residential tenant is the ultimate purchaser of his quarters, he cannot
shift the burden of a tax-recouping rent increase.
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pliers.137 The ideal solution to regressivity must await a greater understanding
of tax incidence.
The rules-and-regulations statutes have also failed to systematize the pro-
cedures used in determining the amounts by which assessments are reduced for
unprofitability. A structure becomes unprofitable as its value decreases either
because of the physical toll of time-that is, depreciation-or because of changes
in consumer preferences or in ways of doing business-that is, obsolescence.
Centrally promulgated rules and regulations measure depreciation by more or
less fixed formulas, which relate age to manner of construction and quality of
upkeep.' 38 But obsolescence, which registers both uniform shifts in residential
and business fashions, and the localized influence of neighborhood changes and
industrial activity, does not readily lend itself to cataloguing and computation.
Although capitalized income is considered an objective measure of obsolescence
by some appraisers, 39 this approach has not been made mandatory by those
who administer the rules-and-regulations statutes. Instead, obsolescence allow-
ances are left to the discretion of the assessors.
1 40
To the extent that administrators have discretion to reduce assessments,
judicial review is inevitable. Unfortunately, the language of the rules-and-
regulations acts is so broad that the courts can authorize policies inconsistent
with those enunciated by the central administrator. The Wyoming statute, for
example, merely paraphrases the constitutional standard of value and instructs
137. See generally VON MEtING, THE SHFTnNG AND INCIDENcE OF TAXATION (1942);
TAYLOR, ECONOM1IICS OF PUBLIC FINANcE 279-81 (1953).
138. See Aax. MANUAL 73, 89, 99, 109, 120, 130, 136, 140, 143, 178, 180, 182; E. H.
BOECKH & AssociAT's, MANUAL OF APPRAISALS 305-06 (3d ed. 1937) (used in Maryland).
In Wyoming, construction type is ignored and depreciation is computed at 2% per year up
to a maximum of 30 years, subject to individual adjustments. Letter from Director, Ad
Valorem Tax Department, Wyoming Board of Equalization, to the Yale Law Journal,
June 5, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library. Ohio lists the factors to be considered but leaves
the specific depreciation allowance to the assessor's discretion. OHIo RULES 107.
139. For instance, the Boeckh formula directs that, if economic obsolescence is caused
by competition from other structures, capitalized income determines value; if it results
from a fall in general market conditions, the allowance is one half of the difference between
depreciated reproduction cost and capitalized income expressed as a percentage of de-
preciated reproduction cost. E. H. BoEcxH & AssocIATEs, MANUAL OF APPRAISALS 331-32
(3d. ed. 1937).
140. Although relying primarily on the Boeckh system for "scientific assessment,"
Wyoming and Maryland have disregarded the Boeckh formula for computing economic
obsolescence and permit assessors to exercise personal judgment in allowing for obsoles-
cence. Md. Instructions § 3(d) ("After consideration of all the facts, the assessor must
then use his best judgment and knowledge of appraisal practices and principles in making
a proper assessment") ; Letter from Director, Ad Valorem Tax Department, Wyoming
Board of Equalization, to the Yale Law Journal, June 12, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library
("Assessors are permitted to modify valuations in areas such as abandoned coal camps
and other similar blighted areas; and also to use their judgment in extreme individual
cases"). Similarly, the Arkansas Manual mentions capitalized income, but stresses the
judgment of the assessor in applying it. ARK. MANUAL 73. The Ohio assessor's discretion
is virtually unlimited. OHio RULES 107.
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local assessors to find "fair value" in accordance with the rules promulgated
by the State Board of Equalization. 141 The Wyoming courts are therefore
presumably free to prefer local adherence to a judicially conceived measure of
value over statewide conformity with the Board's valuation rules. Similarly,
the Maryland rules-and-regulations statute carries over an earlier "full cash
value" provision. 42 On its face, the Arkansas act binds the courts to follow
the central administrator's rules. 143 This provision is vitiated, however, by the
retention of "true market value" in applicable statutes,14 4 by the reiteration of
this criterion in administrative regulations, 45 and by a clause authorizing
courts to depart from the administrator's rules whenever uniformity so re-
quires.' 40 Although the Ohio legislature has substituted "taxable value in
accordance with the rules . . .promulgated by the board of tax appeals" for
"true value," "value" remains in the Ohio constitution, and the statewide ad-
ministrative regulations assign the task of finding "true value" to the local
assessors.
47
Although no cases have yet defined the scope of judicial review under the
rules-and-regulations acts, a 1958 trial court decision in Ohio demonstrates
the hostility with which judges are likely to treat statutory reforms limiting asses-
sors' discretion-and, a fortiori, their own. Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals
was an action challenging the rules and regulations under Ohio's new act, and
the constitutionality of the statute itself.' 48 Section 5703.02(k) of the act em-
powers the state Board of Tax Appeals to adopt "uniform rules and methods
for the assessment of real property according to taxable value," and section
5713.01 directs local assessors to "assess all real estate situated in the county
at its taxable value in accordance with rules and methods adopted, prescribed
and promulgated by the board of tax appeals.' 49 At trial, section 5703.02(k)
was held an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because no stan-
141. Wyo. Coup. STAT. ANN. § 32-506 (Supp. 1957).
142. Md. Laws 1954, ch. 72, at 248. The "value" provisions were later amended to
require an allowance for inflation. MD. CODE ANN. art. 84, § 14 (Supp. 1958).
143. Ark. Acts 1955, act 153, § 5, at 362.
144. ARK. CoNsT. art. 16, § 5; ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-428 (1947).
145. The statutory basis of assessment valuation ...is true market value.
Market value entails an analysis of all the factors that enter into a transaction
arising from the use of property, intelligence and interest of the purchaser and
buyer [sic], time involved, and compulsive characteristics.
ARK. MANuAL 6.
146. Ark. Acts 1955, act 153, § 5, at 362-63. This clause may be necessary to avoid
transgressing the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. See note 22 supra.
147. OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5713.01 (Page 1958) ; OHIO CoNsr. art. 12, § 2; OHIo
RuuiLs 100.
148. No. 200038, Ct. C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, March 29, 1958.
149. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5713.01, 5703.02(k) (Page Supp. 1958).
The rules adopted by the Board of Tax Appeals provide:
Rule 100.
The term "taxable value" means such percentage of "true value" as the Board
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dards were provided for defining "taxable value." The court also held that the
Board's rule 100--defining "taxable value" as "such percentage of true value
as the Board of Tax Appeals shall determine"-usurped the assessor's section
5713.01 power to assess. 150
Carney is important not for its constitutional ruling-which is curable through
careful legislative redrafting-but for the court's understanding of who, in
the nature of things, must exercise ultimate discretion in determining "taxable
value." The opinion construes the word "assess" in section 5713.01 to require
that the assessor, rather than the Board, make the final decision as to "taxable
value." The rules which directed that a "scientific assessment" system be used
were deemed not to foreclose the assessor's discretion, for, the decision implies,
he retains the authority to conform the results of "scientific assessment" to
his own notions of proper assessment. 15 According to the court, the Board would
usurp the assessor's power because it would not establish the taxable percent-
of Tax Appeals shall determine, from time to time . . . as to all taxable real
property.
The "true value" of real property, as here used, means the value to be determined,
in the first instance, by the county auditor [assessor] . . . on consideration of all
the facts relating to the [value of the property] ....
The county auditor shall not be concerned with "taxable value" until such time
as the Board of Tax Appeals shall determine the percentage of "true value" usable
for a given period.
Rule 101 establishes the day on which tax liens attach, and directs separate appraisals
of land and improvements.
Rule 102 deals with the appointment of assistant assessors.
Rule 103 requires the preparation of maps showing all land holdings, and of schedules
and tables used in "scientific" land assessment.
Rule 104 establishes record-keeping and classification procedures.
Rule 105 lays down the general instruction that "all land shall be appraised on the
basis of its actual worth or value as of tax lien date of the year in which appraisal is made,"
and outlines procedures to be used for rural and urban land.
Rule 106 requires the preparation of cost tables based on "prices prevailing during
January, 1956" to be used in the valuing of buildings.
Rule 107 lists factors to be considered in allowing for depreciation and obsolescence.
Rule 108 sets January 1, 1959, as the effective date for the rules.
Rule 109 provides interim rules for 1958 valuations. OHIO RuLEs 100-09.
150. "Here, under the rules of its own adoption the Board of Tax Appeals, and not
the Auditor [assessor] as the statute provides, assumes to determine the taxable value
of real estate . . . ." Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, No. 20003, Ct. C.P., Franklin
County, Ohio, March 29, 1958.
151. [Under the rules] the same basis for inequalities of valuations which are claimed
to have existed because of variations in appraisals in the different counties, would
continue as before, since the actual basis of taxation is the same, namely, the true
value as determined by the several auditors [assessors].
Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra note 150.
Under the rules, the assessors are required to consider "every . . . applicable factor
which may tend to indicate the value the property." OHIO RuLEs 100. Specifically, in
valuing agricultural land, the county assessor is directed to weigh the facts that the farm
is "the homestead of the agriculturalist and his family," and that "farm income is, in
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age of "true value" until after the assessor had completed his computations,
52
and final determination of taxable amount would therefore remain in the
Board.1 3 Presumably, however, the actual date of establishing the ratio of tax-
able to true value would have been considered irrelevant if the "scientific assess-
ment" rules had been viewed as sufficiently precise to eliminate the assessor's dis-
cretion in computing "true value"; the rules themselves would then fall short of
the court's standards.0 4 The court's opinion in effect analogizes the Board's con-
trol over assessors to an appellate court's mandamus power over lower courts. 55
The Board was restricted to enumerating significant factors which assessors
must consider, but was forbidden to ordain particular results.
A PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER REFORM1
Future realty tax reform should be fourfold. Basic assessment policy must be
legislatively, rather than judicially or administratively, determined.156 The tax
should be made less regressive. Similarly situated taxpayers should be uni-
formly treated, and all taxpayers should be apprised of existing policy and
the main, dependent upon the farmer's physical effort" and "business acumen." OHio
RULES 105(B). In valuing commercial property, the assessor is "directed ...to reflect
the income factor... in any uniform, logical way that he may see fit." OHIO RULES 106(C).
152. [T]he Board ... proceeded to define taxable value as the value it itself should
determine by selecting a percentage of the true value which the Auditor [assessor]
had found after a compliance with the statutory provisions.
The net result of all this is that the Auditor makes his appraisal in exactly the
same manner as before and determines the true value of all real property and
according to Rule 100 above noted, is "not concerned with taxable value until such
time as the Board of Tax Appeals shall determine the percentage of true value usable
for a given period."
Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, No. 200038, Ct. C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, March 29,
1958.
The rules themselves are unclear as to the timing of the various steps; but the Board
did not intend, and the court did not expect it, to set the "taxable value" ratio until the "true
values" were established. Letter from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals to the Yale Law
Journal, Sept. 18, 1958, on file in Yale Law Library.
153. The Board's control over the final result is repeatedly denounced by the court.
"Thus it would seem that in reality it is the Board of Tax Appeals that determines the
'Taxable Value' rather than the County Auditor . . . ." "Here, under rules of its own
adoption, the Board of Tax Appeals, and not the Auditor as the statute provides, assumes
to determine the taxable value of real estate.... ." Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra
note 152.
154. The Ohio court's insistence on preserving the assessor's independent judgment
is not unique. See cases cited note 63 supra; cf. Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41
N.E.2d 369 (1942). But see People ex rel. Village of Park Forest v. Cullerton, 13 Il1. 2d
575, 150 N.E.2d 589 (1958) (enforcing local assessment rule).
155. For the mandamus power, see Jewell v. Davies, 192 F.2d 670, 673 (1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1952) (collecting cases).
156. See NEW JERSEY COMM'N ON STATE TAX PoLIcY, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX
iN NEw JERSEY at xi-xii (6th Rep. 1953). But see note 115 supra.
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be able to secure policy enforcement. Finally, the regulation of municipal
spending power should be dissociated from the control of assessment levels.
Restoration of Legislative Policy Making
Legislatures can resume command of realty tax policy only by rejecting the
fiction that the mere incantation of "value" assures that assessments will prop-
erly distribute the overall tax burden. The outright abandonment of value as
a tax base is precluded, however, by the lack of a workable, equitable and ac-
ceptable alternative. Although taxes could theoretically be geared to the vary-
ing desirability of land uses, the development of a comprehensive schedule of
uses and corresponding tax rates would be impractical. Equally unsatisfactory
would be the substitution of original construction costs (even if they could be
accurately determined), for this approach would impose penalties on those
who buy in booms and confer preferences on those who buy in depressions.
1' 7
Moreover, to adopt a standard other than value would be to forfeit the public's
acceptance of that standard as a reasonable tax base. Consequently, legislatures
must retain "value" in their realty tax laws, but must recognize that a statute
providing for assessment according to "value" is no more self-executing than
would be the Internal Revenue Code were it merely to levy a tax on
"income."158
Realty tax legislation must define taxable value with the same precision
that the federal code defines taxable income. As a starting point, an established
and proved distinction should be adopted. An improvement's value should be
defined as its depreciated reproduction cost, and land values should be based
on market comparisons. These techniques are widely accepted by assessors,
can be routinely applied to a great variety of properties, rest on economic and
commercial assumptions which are readily standardized, and produce figures
which can be verified by taxpayers and central administrators. The legislature
must also recognize and explicitly provide for those aspects of its land-use and
tax policies which require deviations from standard assessment procedures. As
157. See 1 BoNBRiGB T 459; cf. Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the Advocatory
Process in Urban Redevelopment, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 134, 137 (1957) (costs of providing
required local services suggested as the basis of taxation). For a discussion of the difficul-
ties in allocating service costs, see Barnes & Raymond, The Fiscal Approach to Land Use
Planning, 21 J. AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS 71 (1955).
Ironically, the prevalence of year-to-year roll copying may in fact result in this
sort of assessment pattern under present laws. See NEv JERSEY Comm'N ON STATE TAx
PoLicy, op. cit. supra note 156, at 114-20.
158. The Internal Revenue Code devotes thirty-one sections to defining "income."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61-121. Thus, early troublesome questions concerning the tax-
ability of stock dividends, the appropriate allowance for a return of capital in mining
operations, and the treatment of gains which accrue to the lessor when a leasehold is for-
feited, no longer plague courts and confuse taxpayers, but are now statutorily settled.
Compare Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S.
103 (1916), and Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940), with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 305-07, 611-14, 109.
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a result, the judiciary would be largely limited to correcting deliberate devia-
tions from legislatively prescribed assessment systems.159 Litigation could be
further reduced by the publication of clear and detailed administrative regula-
tions, which would afford taxpayers an expeditious means of corroborating the
accuracy of assessments. 160 Such regulations would combine with the legis-
lature's own specificity to deprive local assessors of their present wide dis-
cretion, for their ministerial acts could then be scrutinized by state officials
and individual taxpayers.
In defining "value," legislatures need not go so far as to assign precise
dollar amounts to the different characteristics of realty which an assessor evalu-
ates in making an appraisal. Rather, legislation should enumerate all those
characteristics from which assessments may be derived, should detail pro-
cedures and methods for computing the dollar amounts assignable to each
characteristic, and should direct a central administrator to prepare a catalogue
of dollar amounts for every enumerated characteristic. Under legislation of
this sort, local assessors would merely record observable facts-the presence
or absence of the enumerated characteristics in each parcel. The assessor would
be required to assign each such characteristic, if present, its specified value, and to
ignore unenumerated factors. The actual mathematical computation of value
could then be made by automatic computing devices. Admittedly, this concen-
tration of decision-making in the legislature would invite high-powered lobby-
ing. But local assessors currently respond to more circumspect pressures, and
the enactment of valuation formulas by the legislature would shift the locus of
taxing authority to a more politically responsible body.
Basic Valuations Under the Proposed System
Improvements. The first task of a legislature which follows the suggested
approach would be to specify those factors critical to determining the repro-
duction cost of improvements. Probably the most important factors which
affect the cost of constructing, and hence the cost of reproducing, a given build-
ing are its intended function, its size, and the materials of which it is made. To
159. The tax provisions in state constitutions would have to be amended to prevent the
judicial review of assessments in "value" terms not found in the reformed statute and
regulations. See text at notes 205-09% infra. The fourteenth amendment and its state con-
stitutional counterparts would also remain as potential sources of judicial legislation.
Reasonable distinctions among taxpayers have long been upheld, however, and judicial
challenges to reform are likely to be limited to ascertaining the reasonableness of the
new tax structure, and are unlikely to review its effect in particular cases. See 1 CooLEY,
TANA-LION § 332 (4th ed. 1924) (collecting cases).
160. Although detailed standards would probably increase the volume of taxpayer-
assessor disputes, controversies would be framed in factual terms, and informal consulta-
tions or formal administrative review would be likely to settle most cases. In any event,
litigation would require judicial fact-finding, or the construction of regulations, rather
than determinations of "value." See Daniels v. Board of Review, 243 Iowa 405, 423-24, 52
N.W.2d 1, 11-12 (1952) (appeal based, inter alia, on allegation that buildings were not
in existence on assessment day).
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provide for differences in function, a legislature should establish building
,classifications in terms of building uses. Major categories would include
residential, manufacturing, commercial, office, entertainment, and farm struc-
tures. A special category should be created for unique construction. 16' Build-
ings designed for multiple uses would fall under more than one category. Major
categories should be further divided into subtypes like single-family, two-family
or multifamily residences, or heavy, medium or light manufacturing plants.
The central tax authority should then be directed to compile a schedule show-
ing the cost of reproducing representative buildings in each subcategory, differ-
ent costs being provided for variations in size and construction materials. The
legislature should also specify construction features which significantly affect
cost, such as basements and fixtures, and types of partitions, floors, ceilings and
roofing; and should direct the central tax authority to prepare tables showing the
cost added or avoided by variations in these items. Moreover, since costs of con-
struction would doubtless vary throughout the state, model legislation should
direct the central administrator to divide the state into areas corresponding to
the principal patterns of construction costs, and to compensate for interarea
differentials in his schedules. 1 2 Finally and above all, the central administrator
should be directed to rely only on average construction costs, and not to permit
the cost of a particular building to enter into the process of calculating its assess-
ment.
Abandoning the search for "true value" would also make possible the utili-
zation of centrally prepared depreciation tables. Under a "true value" system,
to find an actual decline in utility because of a given structure's age requires
the subjective evaluation of its state of repairs, and speculation as to its useful
life. 1 63 By way of contrast, under the proposed system, depreciation allowances
could be treated as they are in the Internal Revenue Code, with the rate of de-
preciation based on average, rather than actual, declines in value.0 4 Likewise,
161. Unique construction could be assessed directly by the central administrator.
162. Compare ARK. MANUAL 70-71 (dividing state into seven residential-construction-
cost areas).
163. All physical depreciation tables are recommended depreciations under average
conditions. Superior maintenance and below average maintenance are some of the
many factors that must be recognized as a reason for variance from the recom-
mended percentages. Remodelling is another factor of age recovery that the Assessor
must recognize and allow for .. .. Extreme care and judgment must be exercied
in correcting depreciation for age recovery.
Id. at 73.
164. Present income tax policy allows taxpayers to use any one of four accounting
conventions as to depreciation rates, and to assume any reasonable life span. Taxpayer
manipulations are avoided by a requirement of consistency. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
Regulations establishing building life expectancies and depreciation rates are now regarded
as informative only. 2 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 111 777.288, .299.
Similarly, under the British system of local taxation based on annual proceeds, fixed
allowances are provided to convert gross into net income. See Local Government Act,
1948, 11. & 12 Geo. 6, c. 26, § 83; Rating and Valuation Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1;
Rating and Valuation Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 90, § 2. See also Harris, The British
Revaluation of Real Estate for Local Taxation, 5 NAT'L TAX J. 239 (1952).
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special depreciation schedules might reduce taxes on favored activities. Gen-
erally, depreciation schedules should make no provision for the condition of
individual improvements and should thereby reward maintenance-conscious
owners while penalizing the irresponsible. To encourage modernization, re-
modeling could be depreciated from the date a building was originally erected.
A maximum ratio of depreciated cost to annual repair should be established,
however, to prevent new construction and extensive capital improvements from
being disguised as repairs. If the statutory maximum were exceeded, de-
preciation on the excessive improvements could be computed from their date
of completion. Depreciation rates might also be used to stimulate particular
construction deemed necessary to the state's economy. 16 5 Quick depreciation
rates, for instance, could be used to stimulate the construction of low-cost
housing, 166 or the renovation of factories by businesses in financial difficulty. 6 7
Administrative discretion-which is preserved under the existing rules-and-
regulations statutes through obsolescence allowances-could be all but elimi-
nated by isolating, and according special treatment to, the various nonphysical
factors which cause declines in value. Provisions for losses resulting from style
changes could be incorporated into ordinary depreciation schedules, for the
principal elements of architectural obsolescence could be itemized and cor-
responding deductions specifically authorized. 163 In this way, economic pres-
sures inducing the over-intensive use of obsolete buildings would be reduced.1 69
Outmoded realty is often structurally sound but incapable of commanding the
high actual or imputed rents necessitated by the taxes resulting from rigid
assessment practices. Such rigidity fosters overoccupancy, inadequate mainte-
nance, and conversion to nonconforming uses. On the other hand, depreciation
schedules which account for architectural obsolescence would subserve sound
land-use policy.
Obsolescence reflecting the diminished prosperity of particular industries to
which structures are specially adapted should not be included in depreciation
schedules. Rather, legislators should decide on its own merits the question of
whether this type of tax concession ought to be granted in order to preserve fail-
ing enterprises, or denied in order to allow free rein to economic natural selec-
tion. If tax relief is accorded, it should not take the form bf obsolescence de-
ductions but should be integrated into a progralt of reduced realty taxation for
unprofitable businesses'
70
The remaining cause of obsolescence, neighborhood change, is best treated
165. See, e.g., I r. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 168, 169, 174 (quick depreciation for emer-
gency facilities, grain storage facilities and research investments).
166. See note 104 supra.
167. See cases cited note 83 supra.
168. Cf. Bailey, Estimating Accrued Depreciation of Office Buildings, 26 APPRAISAL
J. 270 (1958).
169. Some cities have attacked this problem effectively through building and housing
codes. See COLEAN, RENEWING OuR CiTias 45-46 (1953).
170. See text at notes 197-204 infra.
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as a component of land value. Obsolescence of this sort occurs when, for
example, commercial encroachments into residential areas lower the value
of residential improvements. At the same time, the value of land usable for
further commercial development increases. In this situation, taxing authorities
can either maintain high residential assessments, thus diverting funds needed
for repairs; or reduce residential valuations, thus reflecting the area's diminished
desirability and bring taxes into partial conformity with the owners' ability to
pay; or increase assessments, thus recognizing the land's added attractiveness
for commercial use and encouraging the change.1 7 1 Once the legislature has
selected one of these goals, property values can be computed accordingly.
Land. The assessment of land is less amenable to central control than is the
assessment of buildings, because only extremely localized market data are ap-
propriate for its valuation. The primordial nature of land renders the compu-
tation of its reproduction cost impossible.172 Furthermore, difficulties in allocat-
ing income between land and improvements make the income capitalization of
the former impractical. 173 Therefore, an analysis of sales prices must form the
basis of land valuation under the proposed system. The principal variables
affecting the appraisal of land are its location, physical features and projected
uses. These may be further broken down into the influences of surrounding
demographic patterns, zoning ordinances, and housing and building codes: the
171. These alternatives may be illustrated as follows.
Assume:
Depreciated reproduction cost of building; no allowance for neighburhood . .$4,0(K)
Cost of removing building .............................................. 50u
Market price of land for dwelling use ................................... 1,000
Market price of land for commercial use ................................ 6,000
The valuation possibilities are then:
a. Value for residential use ...................... $4,000 + $1,000 = $ 5,000
b. Value for commercial use ...................... $6,000 - $ 500 = $ 5,500
c. Maximum assessment .......................... $4,000 + $6,000 = $10,000.
Standard commercial appraisal policy is to use formula (a) or (b), whichever produces
the greater valuation. Stated differently, the land is valued for residential use until the
commercial use values of the land exceeds the residential use value of the land and building
combined. This, of course, reflects the point at which economic motivation would result
in a use change. Interview with Norman R. Penedict, M.I.A., Hamden, Conn., June 5,
1958. Since the legislature may seek to control, rather than reflect, economic forces which
affect land use, it is free to adopt any of the three formulas.
172. See Wagner, Appraisal of Single-Family Homes, 26 APPRAISAL J. 40, 43 (1958).
173. Capitalizing rental income, except in the relatively rare case in which ground rent
and building rent are separate charges, will yield the value of the improved parcel rather
than the value of the land alone. Commercial appraisers, if required to allocate between
land and improvements, normally do so by subtracting the depreciated reproduction cost
of the building from the capitalized income value of the improved parcel. See WENYr 174.
Transplanting this approach from its commercial context to tax valuation is possible only
if capitalized income is to be the sole measure of taxable value, since directing an assessor
to add the depreciated reproduction cost of the building to the capitalized income value of
the land, determined as described above, clearly would take him right back to his initial
point of departure. See 1 BONBRIGHT 485 n.68.
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proximity of transportation facilities, schools, churches, parks, nuisances and
centers of industry and commerce; and the size and shape of the individual
lot.174 The foregoing factors are less easily categorized, however, than con-
struction costs and depreciation rates, and thus are less readily translated into
uniformly applicable schedules of relevant characteristics and corresponding
values. A comparatively large measure of assessor discretion is consequently
unavoidable in land valuation. Legislatures can restrict the land assessor's
freedom of judgment only through the clear elaboration of policy, an insistence
on valuation by stated formulas wherever feasible, and the establishment of
stringent procedural, publicity and review requirements.
The clear exposition of land policy is most needed and will prove most useful
in localities of changing land use. Where areas are in transition between, for
example, farm and residential, residential and commercial, or commercial and
industrial uses, assessors currently may value land in accordance with either
its present or prospective use. Legislatures should eliminate the assessor's
discretion to choose between these alternatives, and should themselves de-
termine, for instance, whether land valuations are to impede commercial en-
croachments or are to accelerate neighborhood change. 175 Thus, a mandate to
assess land as farm acreage until it is actually sold as subdivided building lots
would benefit persons holding the land and would exert no pressure to acceler-
ate the process of subdivision. 176 On the other hand, speculative land-holding
and leap-frog development would be discouraged by a legislative requirement
that all land in substantially subdivided areas be assessed according to its
optimum use consistent with the projected development of the subdivision.
77
Another, more limited sphere for legislative policy-making is the elimination
of nonconforming uses-which might be advanced by assessing the land in-
volved as though it were being used in an optimum, conforming manner.178 A
174. See generally E. M. Fisher, Economic Aspects of Urban Land Use Patterns, 6
J. OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 198 (1958).
175. On the basis of the figures presented in note 171 supra, if the tax rate were 4c%,
annual tax liability at maximum assessment would be $180 more than the liability under
the larger of either alternative. Were occupants to bear such a tax increase, they might
be encouraged to move to more desirable neighborhoods. Those landlords who are unable
to shift such a tax increase to tenants will, because of reduced profits, find conversion to
new uses more attractive.
176. For such a mandate, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(a) (1957). Decreasing
the cost of holding lands idle enables speculators to delay sales and to await rises in
market value. Cf. Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an Instrument for Com-
njunity Planning, 57 YALE L.J. 219, 221-22 (1947). Such speculative holding can be an
advantage to a community beset by the demands of a swelling population. See Beach v.
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954).
177. For such a requirement see MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19 (1957).
178. Thus, if slaughterhouses which had depressed land values in one of the most
valuable sections of New York City to $5 a foot, and which were held by their owners
largely because the acquisition of equivalent facilities within the city was impossible, had
been taxed not on the $5 per foot basis indicated by sales of nearby land, but on the $50 or
$500 per foot basis that would prevail if the nonconforming use were removed, a change
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less modest goal-the full use of scarce urban land-might be subserved by
a quasi-depreciation allowance recognizing the lowered adaptability of im-
proved land.
179
Were land-use preferences enumerated by the legislature, the assessor's dis-
cretion in this respect would be curtailed. Given a policy goal, however, asses-
sors would still have substantial latitude in the actual computation of values.
For example, a directive to ignore the higher worth of adjacent commercial
property in miied-use areas would not dictate the value which an assessor
should put on a given residentially used lot. No substitute has been developed
for informed judgment in land valuation. Nonetheless, two techniques are
available for limiting the scope, and uniformly applying the results, of the
assessor's subjective valuations. Repeated empirical studies have shown that
uniform relationships exist between a lot's size and shape, and its value.
These relationships, fundamental to "scientific assessment," can be expressed
in terms of standard lots. Thus, according to one study, a lot 150 feet deep is
worth fifteen per cent more than a standard 1CO foot lot. 80 And a different
sampling revealed that reducing a lot's width from the conventional 50 to 45
feet reduced its value by five per cent.18 ' Detailed schedules have been compiled
at various times and places to show the effect on a lot's value of its length, width,
shape, and position on the block in which it is located.18 2 A tax-law provision
requiring the use of tables of this sort, as compiled by the central tax adminis-
trator, would limit the assessor's discretionary function to finding the value of
a hypothetical standard lot for each significantly distinct area in his jurisdiction.
Value differentials among these standard lots would also tend to fall into
patterns. In commercial areas, values are highest at the intersections of major
streets. 8 3 The most valuable industrial land is concentrated near heavy trans-
portation facilities. 8 4 Land's utility for residences and its topography may well
in use would have been encouraged. See Zeckendorf, New Cities for Old, The Atlantic,
Nov. 1951, pp. 31, 35. See generally Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conform-
ing to Zonizg Regulations, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 477 (1942).
179. Construction of an improvement involves a calculated risk, in that it makes the
site unavailable for possible, more profitable, near-future use. This risk would be reduced
if owners were afforded tax reductions commensurate with the durability of the improve-
ment. This allowance might be measured by the cost of making the site available for other
uses-the cost of demolition. Compare Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an
Instrument of Community Planning, 57 YALE L.J. 219 (1947).
180. MANUFACTURER'S APPRAISAL CO., PROSPECTUS OF NEW YORK SOMERS SYSTEMs
SERVlCE 9-11 (undated). See also ZANGERLE, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING
106-13 (2d ed. 1927).
181. E.M. BOEcKH & ASSOcIATES, MANUAL OF APPRAISALS 347 (3d ed. 1937). See
also NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, URBAN LAND APPRAISAL 144-45 (Assess-
ment Practice Series No. 2, 1940). Compare INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC SERVICE, UNIVERSITY
OF CONNECTICUT, HANDBOOK FOR CONNECTICUT ASSESSORS 19, 104 (1950).
182. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, URBAN LAND APPRAISAL 58-148
(Assessment Practice Series No. 2, 1940).
183. WEImER & HOYT 446-49 (3d ed. 1954).
184. See authorities on industrial location cited -note 134 supra.
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rise and fall together.185 The location of the most and least valuable lots in each
group of lots can be ascertained from a consensus of expert appraisers. A care-
ful appraisal of such key lots and statistically selected intervening ones would
enable assessors to develop formulas yielding standard, per-unit values for all
intervening lots.'86 Adjustments for positional and dimensional deviations from
the standard lot could be made by applying the percentages found in the schedules
described in the preceding paragraph.
Deriving and modifying standard lot values in this fashion would, however, in-
adequately reflect many conditions which cannot be systematized but which
peculiarly affect individual lot values. A sophisticated realty tax statute would
specify the conditions which could justify deviations from per-unit land values.
Drainage, pitch, immediate access to transportation arteries, proximity to
nuisances, and similar factors might provide the basis for statutorily authorized
deviations. Precise allowances of this sort would, in most instances, be dis-
cretionary. To prevent an abuse of discretion, the statute might establish the
maximum allowance permissible for each authorized factor and for all factors,
and the maximum legal differential between allowances granted to different
properties which are affected by the same factor and are within the same use
group.
Since personal judgments ultimately determine the valuation of key lots and
the allowance of additional adjustments, procedural safeguards are essential
to an equitable land assessment system. Taxpayers should receive notice of
their assessments and opportunities for review. The local assessor should be di-
rected to publish preliminary assessments sufficiently in advance of their becom-
ing final to permit hearings, and to allow for appeals by taxpayers or spending
authorities. Publication could take the form of lists of the assessed values
of all lots, and maps showing the key lots and the standard value or values for
each city block. After the preliminary assessments have been published, the
assessors should hold hearings at which the selection of key lots, the values
assigned those lots, and the valuation formulas themselves can be contested
by interested parties. When assessments become final, revised lists and maps
should be prepared and forwarded to the central tax authorities for approval.
Alternatively, two distinct stages of notice, hearing, revision and review might
be instituted-the first establishing key lots and per-unit values, and the second
assigning values to individual lots.
At any time prior to the day on which assessments become final, taxpayers
or levying authorities should be permitted to petition local assessors to allow
individual lot variances from the assessment pattern. For every variance
granted, whether on request or otherwise, the assessor should state in writing
his reasons for distinguishing the lot in question from contiguous, formula-
185. See generally MAY, THE VALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 86-106 (2d
ed. 1956).
186. This method would only require the refinement of present scientific land valuation
techniques. See note 62 supra; NATIONAL Ass'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, URBAN LAND
APPRAISAL 52-58 (Assessment Practice Series No. 2, 1940).
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valued land. His statement should be sent promptly to contiguous land owners,
local levying authorities, and the state tax commissioner. The commissioner
should have the authority independently to reject or approve all locally allowed
variances. Variance requests rejected by local assessors should also be appeal-
able to the state tax commissioner. Judicial review should then extend only
to determinations by the commissioner and should be limited to issues of
alleged actual fraud or failure to comply with statutory procedures.
Departures from the Basic System
The suggested system for assessing land and improvements would allow
taxpayers to verify their own liability, would sharply curtail the assessor's
discretion, and would minimize the need for costly legal action and the occasions
for judicial policy-making. Two other problems, regressivity and relief for
unprofitable businesses, remain.
Regressivity. Studies of tax incidence must be undertaken before statutory
changes designed to render realty taxation less regressive are initiated
18
T
Immediate assistance for the owner-occupiers of residential property is possible,
however, for their inability to shift realty taxes is presently demonstrableSS
To the extent that such assistance would stimulate the construction of low-
cost, single-family units competing with low-rent apartments, the tenants of
these apartments could also be benefited.' 8 9 But the identical treatment of
rental and owner-occupied property in this regard would be inappropriate,
since benefits intended for tenants would accrue to their landlords whenever
the latter were unable to shift realty taxes to the former. 90 For owner-
187. See text at notes 131-37 supra.
188. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
189. Cooperative apartments, combining elements of tenant ownership and rental,
would present a special case. To the extent that cooperatives are actually run on a "share-
the-costs" basis, they should be treated as owner-occupied, since the incidence of the tax
would then be on the cooperators. But to the extent that they are run as businesses by
management groups who set maintenance charges in the same manner as other landlords
set rents, they should be treated as rental properties. See generally Anderson, Co-operative
Apartments in Florida: A Legal Analysis, 12 U. MIAmI L. REV. 13 (1957) ; McCullough,
Co-operative Apartments in Illinois, 26 Cni.-KENT L. REv. 303 (1948).
190. See Burkhead, Property Tax as a Burden on Shelter, 20 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN.
255, 262-63 (1944). The burden of the tax or the benefit of an exemption would be shifted
only when new construction was an important influence in the market. See note 130 supra.
Shifting therefore would be impossible during bad times when construction was halted
or during a period of extreme shortage. See note 133 supra. Moreover, price and prejudice
bar large segments of the population from competing for new housing and hence insulate
many of the potential victims of regressivity from the realty tax. These qualifications,
recognized by economists in evolving their rule that taxes on improvements but not on
land are shifted, VON MERING, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 161-62
(1942) ; MoRTON, HOUSING TAXATION 112-15 (1955), although sometimes ignored in stat-
ing their legislative recommendations, id. at 192-94, make direct expenditures for lower
income housing seem a more efficient use of public funds available for the mitigation of
property tax regressivity than the granting of exemptions to owners of rental property.
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occupiers, regressivity can be reduced by graduating tax rates, by adopting
assessment criteria which favor cheap construction, or by enacting fixed-sum
or graduated exemptions.191 The well-known and often-used exemption device
seems preferable, because a multiplicity of statutory criteria for different types
of construction would be cumbersome, and the mere mention of progressive rates
would doubtless arouse unnecessarily intense political opposition.
192
Exemption provisions must be carefully drawn to prevent excessive revenue
losses. The definition of "homestead" found in existing exemption clauses
should be abandoned, for the term often embraces income-producing farm
and business property. 93 Correctly drafted, an exemption would be limited
to realty used by its owner as a home with assessments being allocated in the
case of mixed-use residential property. The amount of exemptions should be
limited to the lowest sum consistent with the policy of mitigating regressivity.
9 4
Taxation on a broad base should be preserved, and can be reconciled with the
goal of progressive taxation by graduating the exemptions. Thus, fifty per
cent of the first $3,000 of eligible property's assessed valuation, forty per cent
191. See note 15 supra.
192. Graduated tax rates would also be unconstitutional under the uniformity clauses
of many state constitutions. See note 19 supra.
193. See, e.g., FLA. CozsT. art. 10, § I.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.12 (1943) (homestead
includes 160 acres adjoining rural residence; urban homestead includes house used for
business as well as residence). The Florida statute has been held to cover hotels, apart-
ment houses and tourist camps. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida
Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 372-75 (1949).
194. Further study is indicated before such exemptions can be calculated. Some in-
dication of the kinds of studies needed and the general results to be expected can be found
in available correlations of Wisconsin property and income tax data.
Annual Property Tax Payments, Assuming
Average No Exemption $2,000 Exemption
Family In- Family Percentage of Percentage of
come Group Income Anount Family Income Amount Family Income
$ 0-249 $ 149 $141 94.63% $ 88 59.1%
250-499 374 134 35.83 81 21.7
500-749 637 136 21.35 85 13.3
750-999 884 133 15.05 78 8.8
1,000-1,249 1,128 126 14.61 71. 6.3
1,250-1,499 1,391 125 8.99 71 5.1.
1,500-1,749 1,625 133 8.18 77 4.7
1,750-1,999 1,871 137 7.32 82 4.4
2,000-2,499 2,223 148 6.66 94 4.2
2,500-2,999 2,732 183 6.70 129 4.7
3,000-3,999 3,436 208 6.05 155 4.5
4,000-4,999 4,459 244 5.47 191 4.3
5,000 and over 12,743 378 2.97 323 2.5
MoRTON, HousING TAXATION 228-29 (1955).
Families receiving an income of less than $1,000 almost invariably fall into one of three
classes: those on public relief; those whose income for the particular year has been re-
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of the second $3,000, and so forth, could be exempted. 9 5 Levying authorities,
bearing in mind that exemptions inevitably bring revenue reductions unless
tax rates are simultaneously raised, should be prepared to enact such increases.
In any event, revenue losses should not be recouped by sales taxes or other
regressive devises.19
Recognition of Business Hardship. The present judicial and administrative
manipulation of "value" designed to provide relief for unprofitable enterprises
indicates a strongly felt need which, if ignored by future legislation, will invite
continued manipulation. The proposed elimination of "value" as the keystone
of the assessment system would, however, destroy the theoretical basis of the
present distinction between low-"value," or obsolete, and low-"income," or
badly managed, properties, 19 7 and would leave to the legislatures the formula-
tion of a new rationale for assisting unprofitable businesses. In devising a
rationale, a legislature should be guided by the probable effects of possible
duced by losses, but who are very likely sustaining their standard of living from savings;
and those receiving a retirement income adequate for their own needs.
Failure to eliminate regressivity as regards the first group is not serious. The number
of people in this group owning property is likely to be small, and, in any event, taxing
relief recipients merely moves money from one governmental pocket to another. Apparent-
ly regressive taxation of the second group-those who are suffering from setbacks and
living on capital-is defensible on the theory that until their decline in income is reflected
in a decrease in their housing standard of living, sufficient ability to pay exists to war-
rant the unabated taxation of their homes. As for the last group-pensioners living in a
home purchased during their earning years-regressivity could be reduced, and the social
interest in the independence of the aged served, by providing additional exemptions to
those whose major source of income is retirement income as defined in INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 37.
Similar qualifications are necessary in dealing with the $5,000-and-over income bracket.
Statistically, this grouping is too large to be meaningful. One or two cases of very large
incomes coupled with ownership of only reasonably luxurious homes could overbalance
many instances where the ratio of tax to income was close to that in the preceding brackets.
For instance, at a 3% tax rate, property taxes would consume 5% of the income of a
family earning $6,000 and owning a $10,000 home, while one with a $100,000 income and
a $50,000 home would pay a realty tax amounting to 1.5% of its income. Bracketing 90
families in the $6,000 class with 10 cases in the $100,000 groups would produce an average
tax payment which would be 2.7%A of the average income. Thus, the mildly regressive
trend present up to the $4,000-4,999 bracket probably continues to be gradual for some
distance beyond. Moreover, while those in the extremely high income brackets do feel the
bite of the property tax least, this is perhaps acceptable because of their great income tax
load, and inevitable because of their high marginal income tax rates and the deductibility
of local tax payments.
Institution of a $2,000 exemption would reduce the regressiveness of the realty tax on
families in the $1,000-4,999 brackets from 9.14 percentage points to 2 percentage points.
Further reduction of regressivity, without raising exemptions to prohibitive levels, could
be accomplished by allowing an additional exemption limited to low-value property.
195. British income taxation achieves progressivity below the £2,000 level through
graduated exemptions. Finance Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 10, § 40.
196. For a discussion of this problem, see UTAH INVESTIGATING CoMM. OF UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL UNITs, REPORT 84-143 (1936).
197. See text at notes 76-88 supra.
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standards. Were existing rules codified-thus, in effect, preserving the "value"-
"income" dichotomy-tax reductions would be conditioned on the productive
use of property within its capabilities, so that new uses bf adaptable property
would be encouraged, while current uses of sterile property would qualify for
tax relief. Of course, any statutory distinction between poorly managed and
well-managed-but-obsolete realty would invite litigation. A different approach,
suggested by the contemporary subsidization of migrant industries and passenger
railroads through reduced assessments, would favor only those enterprises
essential to the local community.'01 Following yet a third approach, a state legis-
lature could adopt the view that business instability is itself an evil to be com-
bated by means of tax devices, and grant relief to all unprofitable undertakings.
Whatever the subsidization policy adopted, it could be given effect by allowing
unprofitable businesses within its scope to pay a tax based on an alternative
assessment derived from capitalized income. A given business's eligibility for
this alternative could be deemed established whenever that portion of the busi-
ness's annual income allocable to its real property is less than a specified per-
centage of its assessed valuation arrived at by standard computations. Income
to be capitalized should be not estimated future, but actual current, earnings,
and capitalization rates should be set not by assessors on a taxpayer-to-tax-
payer basis, but by the legislature for the different classes of favored businesses.
Capitalizing income on the basis of actual earnings would gear alternative
assessments to demonstrated financial need. The determination and definition
of an individual owner's earnings could be accomplished by requiring him to
supply a copy of his federal income tax return for the relevant period when
applying for an alternative assessment; and by equating current earnings to the
federal definition of taxable income.1 9 For firms which have inordinately low
income or run deficits, legislation might continue the "salvage value"200 rule
and assess improvements at either the highest price obtainable on liquidation
or an arbitrary percentage of the normal reproduction-cost assessment.
Utilizing federal income tax returns to define current earnings would not solve
all administrative problems attending the computation of the proposed, alterna-
tive, capitalized-income assessments. Difficulties would remain in allocating a
single firm's income among its branches in various jurisdictions, and between
its realty and nonrealty production components. 20 With respect to interstate
198. See N.Y. Times, June 16, 1958, p. 1, col. 2 (railroad) ; id., July 23, 1958, p. 29,
col. 5 (same) ; notes 83, 110 supra (migrant industries).
199. Adoption of federal standards has been suggested and experimentally used as'a
device for simplifying state and local income tax problems. HAIG & SHouP, THE FINAN-
cIA. PRO3LEM Or THE Cirv OF NEW YORK 259-65 (1952). Auditing problems can thus be
largely shifted to the federal revenue service. Under federal law, local officials are given
access to federal returns. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b); Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Exchange of Information for Purposes of Federal, State, and Local Tax Ad-
ministration, 2 NAT'L TAx J. 151 (1949).
200. See text at note 84 supra.
201. The net income of a firm producing several products is no sure indication of the
profitability of a plant producing only one product. Similarly, identical net income earned
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firms, state income and corporate tax laws have resolved the former problem
through an arbitrary formula which allocates income according to the local-to-
total ratio of sales, payroll disbursements, and fixed-asset values. 20 2 A similar
procedure could be developed for attributing income to each of a firm's plants
within a state.
A solution to the second allocation problem-isolating income attributable
to the realty factors of production-cannot be achieved with such facility. In
appraising profitable specialties, many courts approximate a solution to this
problem by establishing depreciated reproduction cost as a ceiling on assess-
ments.20 3 A more satisfactory answer may lie in the central preselection of
capitalization rates. After studies have been made of the various industries
within a state, a statute or regulation could promulgate rates reflecting the
proportion of income attributable to real estate in each type of industry. A
given rate would not conform exactly to a particular firm's revenue loss,
because the allocation between realty and nonrealty would represent average,
industry-wide figures, rather than any individual circumstances. As a product
of legislative grace, however, this imperfect computation should be no more
objectionable than the inflexible dependency deduction of income tax statutes.
In any event, the alternative assessment derived from this rate would effect
in a uniform, predictable and politically responsible manner tax adjustments
which are currently left to the tax assessor's discretion. Furthermore, since.
under this system, capitalization rates would also have to be computed for
each industry to allow for the risks and managerial costs peculiar to that in-
dustry,2 0 4 these rates could well be combined with those derived for determin-
ing the realty-nonrealty ratio. The resulting combined rate would, of course,
when multiplied by the actual income attributable to a parcel, yield that parcel's
alternative valuation.
Constitutional Amendments
Insulating legislative tax policy from undue judicial interference will require
the amendment of most state constitutions. The language in many constitu-
by a professional man and a farmer, or a manufacturing plant and a parking lot, is com-
posed of very different returns on the components of labor, land and equipment employed.
202. A newly proposed uniform law allocates income according to the arithmetic aver-
age of (1) the ratio of the taxpayer's tangible property within the state to his total tan-
gible property; (2) the ratio of the taxpayer's payroll expenditures within the state to
his total payroll expenditures; and (3) the ratio of the taxpayer's sales for delivery with-
in the state to total sales. UNIFORm DIVISION-OF INCOME FOR TAX PuRposEs ACT §§ 9-17;
Pierce, The Uniform Divirsion of Income for State TaX Purposes, 35 TAXES 747 (1957).
203. See text at notes 69-75 supra.
204. For examples of such rates, suggested for use by commercial appraisers, see E. H.
BOECKH & AssociATEs, MANUAL OF APPRAISALS 330 (3d ed. 1947) (rates range from 234-
3%/o on long-term leaseholds to 12% on outlying, cheaply constructed and slum properties);
Nelson, Capitalissation Rates, 26 APPRAISAL J. 34, 37-39 (1958).
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tions establishing "value" as the basis of realty taxation 2 0 5 and long-standing
custom in other jurisdictions,2 06 will probably make any noticeable departure
from "true value" unpalatable to many courts. Thus reform legislation would
run the risk of total invalidation. Even under permissive constitutions, mis-
understanding and opposition might well result in detailed procedural pro-
visions and policy directives being treated as merely advisory and not binding.
20 7
Such a failure to recognize the abandonment of "true value" as the basic feature
of reform legislation would, manifestly, defeat reform itself. Less drastically,
the limitations in some state constitutions on permissible realty tax exemptions
might stand in the way of many antiregressive and subsidy provisions. 20 8 In
sum, constitutional reform will often be a necessary prerequisite to assessment
reform.209
Separating Spending Controls from Assessment Policy
A final realty tax reform would sever the state regulation of municipal taxing
and borrowing powers from the determination of property values-a dissociation
which can be achieved under any type of assessment statute. The emergence
of the "normal market" doctrine during the 1930's illustrates the dangers in-
herent in limiting the authority to tax and borrow to a fixed percentage of
assessed value. The impracticality of these limitations has been further demon-
strated during inflationary periods when assessors, unwilling to exercise their
discretion to increase assessments, have hampered the maintenance of local
governmental services once tax-rate limits have been reached. In many locali-
ties where sales and income taxes have opened new sources of revenue to
municipal governments, rate limits on realty taxation have simply become
205. See Miss. CoNsr. art. 4, § 112; appendix at p. 386 infra.
206. In Vermont, for instance, the constitution makes no mention of "value," but real
property has been taxed according to its value in money since 1820. Vt. Laws 1820, ch. 1,
§ 1 (now VT. STAT. §§ 684, 713, 748 (1947)). But even such a long tradition need not
prevent a departure from abstract notions of "value." Cf. Clark v. City of Burlington, 101
Vt. 391, 143 Atl. 677 (1928).
207. Cf. Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942).
208. Such a limitation may be express, GA. CoxsT. art. 7, § 2-5404, or implied, S.C.
CoNsT. art. 10, §§ 1, 4, Textile Hall Corp. v. Hill, 215 S.C. 262, 54 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1949).
209. The amendment would have to be explicit enough to prevent judicial miscon-
struction from avoiding a statute implementing the amendment, but broad enough to pre-
vent courts from formulating their own extrastatutory, value-review standards. The amend-
ment might read:
All real propertynot exempted by law shall be taxed according to standards speci-
fied by the legislature or an administrative agency designated by the legislature.
These standards may establish such classifications and such differing techniques for
assessing real property as shall seem to the legislature best suited to distributing
tax burdens equitably. No court shall review any assessment in any manner or on
any grounds not specified by statute.
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obsolete as means of checking local spending power.2 1 0 Whatever the locality,
if spending control is felt desirable, ceilings on total disbursements rather than
on the tax rate per dollar of assessment seem preferable. Several states now
impose ceilings of this sort, which either are in explicit dollar amounts, as in Min-
nesota,2 1 1 or provide that total tax revenues in each year may not exceed those
of the preceding year by more than a given percentage, as in Colorado.
2 12
Current methods for adjusting spending ceilings upward are the local refer-
endum,213 proving necessity or other good cause to a state administrative
body,214 and action by the state legislature.21 5 A possible alternative approach
would correlate municipal spending power and business cycles by adjusting
disbursement levels in accordance with the cost-of-living index.210 Regardless
of the device adopted, legislatures seeking to control expenditures should not
do so by restricting tax rates.
CONCLUSION
Real estate taxation has long suffered from the legislatures' abdication of
their responsibilities to courts and administrators who manipulate empty
statutory intonations on "value" in order to implement policies of their
own selection. Assessment standards, once chosen, are unevenly applied, and
judicial review is sporadic--conditions which work to the disadvantage of
taxpayers and taxing authorities. Consequently, detailed statutes delineating
the procedures as well as the goals of realty tax assessment should replace the
present legislative pronouncements directing assessors to find "true value," "act-
ual value," "cash value," or "market value." At the same time, limits on local
spending should be divorced from municipal tax rates. In this way, the distri-
bution of tax burdens could be democratically determined, assessors would be
shorn of their present policy-maing function, taxpayers could protect them-
selves against bias, and the necessity for realty tax litigation would be mini-
mized.
Of course, vested interests which benefit from current assessment practices
210. Most laws limiting municipal taxation apply only to property taxation and invite
the evasive substitution of alternative taxes. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6851(C)
(Supp. 1957). A few tax-limit laws, however, realistically cover revenues from all sources.
See, e.g., N.Y. CoNsT. art. 8, § 10.
211. MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.09(3), .12 (Supp. 1957).
212. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-6-43 (1954).
213. See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. 9, § 2; OHio Rzv. CODE ANN. §§ 5705.07, .26 (Page
1954).
214. See, e.g., IN. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-309, -311, -314 (1951).
215. Such a course is possible wherever rate limits are statutory rather than constitu-
tional. See, e.g., MINN. CoNsT. art. 1.1, § 5; MINx. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.31, .33-.48 (1947),
275.32 (Supp. 1957).
216. MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.11, .12 (Supp. 1957) (county tax limits increased for




may be able to frustrate whatever popular sentiment exists for reform. Recent
judicial decisions in New Jersey and Connecticut indicate, however, that, by
refusing to undertake piecemeal a review of assessment irregularities, the courts
may at least quicken the pace of legislative reform. In Switz v. Middletown, for
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered town officials to reassess
all parcels at "full value" within three years.217 Through this sweeping order,
the court sought to remand the question of chronic underassessment to the legis-
lature.218 Faced with this order overturning decades of administrative custom
and having serious implications for every county in New Jersey,219 the legis-
lature has debated assessment reform at length and may soon codify the average,
state-wide assessment level at forty per cent of market price as determined
from comparative sales.
220
A more prompt legislative response followed the Connecticut case of E.
Ingraham Co. v. Bristol, in which the Supreme Court of Errors made known its
intention to enforce the statutory "full value" provision strictly.22 1 The Con-
necticut legislature thereupon passed legislation substituting assessment at a
217. 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957).
218. Id. at 598, 130 A.2d at 25.
219. New Jersey assessors have traditionally assessed at less than computed value,
although "true value" assessment has long been required by statute and, prior to 1947, by
the New Jersey constitution. N.J. CoNsT. art. 4, § 7(12) (1875); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-23 (Supp. 1957). New Jersey courts have not only condoned the administrative
policy of underassessment but also refused to reduce the assessments of relatively over-
assessed taxpayers. Instead, the courts have insisted that aggrieved taxpayers seek redress
by utilizing administrative procedures for bringing assessments of other taxpayers up to
full value. Royal Mfg. Co. v. Board of Equalization of Taxes, 76 N.J.L. 402, 70 Atl. 978
(Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd, 78 N.J.L. 337, 74 AtI. 525 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909). In Township
of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946), the Supreme Court held that, since
the administrative procedures were so cumbersome as effectively to deny a grossly over-
assessed taxpayer a remedy, the policy of the New Jersey courts violated due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment. In 1947, the year after the Hillsborough decision,
New Jersey revised its constitution, omitting the full value requirement. N.J. CoNsT. art.
8, § 1. Nevertheless, the taxing statute continued to require uniform assessment at "full
and fair value." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23 (Supp. 1957). The courts responded to the
revised constitution and the Hillsborough case by reversing the Royal doctrine and, in
Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Taxation, 16 N.J. 329, 108 A.2d 598
(1954), by reducing a contested assessment to the prevailing level. But the conflict be-
tween the statute requiring full value assessment and the constitutional uniformity edict
remained to plague the judicial conscience of the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt. See id. at
346, 108 A.2d at 607 (dissenting opinion) ; Gibraltar Corrugated Paper Co. v. Township
of North Bergen, 20 N.J. 213, 223, 119 A.2d 135, 140 (1955) (concurring opinion) ; Del-
aware, L. & W.R.R. v. Neeld, 23 N.J. 561, 575, 130 A.2d 6, 14 (1957) (concurring opinion).
The decision in Switz, requiring administrative compliance with both uniformity and full
value provisions, was the logical outgrowth of this development, though the stay in carry-
ing out the required revaluation once again drew protest from the Chief Justice. Switz v.
Middletown Township, 23 N.J. 580, 618, 130 A.2d 15, 35 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
220. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1958, § 8 (Real Estate), p. 1, col. 7.
221. 144 Conn. 374, 132 A.2d 563 (1957).
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locally determined rate for assessment at "full value. '222 Like the proposed New
Jersey statute, the Connecticut act avoids rather than solves basic property tax
policy issues. Hopefully, judicial persistence in revealing the inadequacies of
contemporary legislation will eventually produce more constructive results.
222. Conn. Public Acts 1957, No. 673, at 1090. This statute had the effect of codify-
ing the status quo in most localities. Except in a few areas, uniform underassessment had
been the officially acknowledged practice under the "full value" statute. See [1954] CONN.
TAX COMM'R, INF01IATION RELATIVE TO THE ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAXES
35-43 (1.955).
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